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ABSTRACT
Globalization has drastically improved latecomer countries' access to advanced technologies.
To the extent that technology upgrading is important for development, it provides a unique
opportunity for latecomer countries to raise per capita income. One such way of upgrading the
technological capabilities of a latecomer country/region is through the development of
"technopoles" or Science Cities. These technopoles, if successfully developed, can help regions
to achieve several objectives: (a) transfer of technology, (b) create local spin-off companies, and
(c) gain competitive edge by embracing better technology and (d) increase productivity. Thus, in
the last half-century, many governments invested heavily on the planning and development of
such technopoles with the aim of making them the "innovation center" of science and
technology for the region/country. However, the success rates of these planned technopoles
differ. Some technopoles emerged as new "growth engines" but some became a burden to the
government and a waste of scarce resources. If governments understood the critical ingredients
for successful technopole development, they could better plan for them at the outset before they
embark on such major economic and urban projects.
This paper shows a framework of success factors that drove the transformation of Boston's
Route 128 area from an industrial ruin into a world-class high-tech industrial cluster (or
technopole) driven by knowledge-based asset (Chapter 2). When tested against three planned
technopoles, namely Akademgorodok (Russia), Taedok Science Town (South Korea) and
Tsukuba Science City (Japan), it showed that as more factors in the framework exist in these
planned areas, the more vibrant the technopole e.g. more private companies within the
community, more interaction and public-private partnerships, spin-off companies, etc (Chapter
3). Lessons are drawn from the planned technopoles case studies, which could serve as policy
considerations for regional land use and economic planners. The framework is then applied to
Singapore and recommendations are made on how Singapore can improve their economic
policies to better realize its vision of a world-class science and technology hub (Chapter 4).
Lastly, the entrepreneurial culture factor is discussed in greater detail in the Singapore context
(Chapter 5). It examines the state of entrepreneurial culture in Singapore and whether she is
truly lack of entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1: The worldwide "technopole" phenomena
Economies operate increasingly in markets that demand innovation and flexibility to
meet the new challenges. In order to do so, nations are desperately seeking
technological improvements to gain competitive advantage in the global economy.
Technology contributes to the development of the society, education, and economy of a
nation through the discovery, transfer, diffusion, and application of new knowledge.
Thus, those areas that have failed to make the necessary investments on high value-
adding knowledge-based industries have remained rooted in declining activities or non-
competitive businesses whereas areas that did have emerged as successful locales of
innovation.
Two internationally successful regional economies that have succeeded in becoming
growth poles of the nation through the use of cutting edge technology are
Massachusetts's Route 128 and California's Silicon Valley. They have been a source of
inspiration for cities around the world as the model for a knowledge-based economy.
Many regions have tried to copy these two areas when trying to develop their own
technopoles. The idea of developing high-tech industries through technopoles is firmly
based upon the assumption that technological innovation leads to economic growth.
1.2: What is a planned "technopole"?
Ideally, technopoles are planned centers that generate the basic materials of the
informational economy for the promotion of high-tech industries. Technopoles are often
developed by a special type of public-private alliance', in association with universities,
quasi-public or nonprofit type of developments e.g. research institutes. These
organizations are specifically implanted in order to help in the generation of new
knowledge, together with the private companies that occupy the resulting spaces.
The area works on a basis of a cluster concept and is often an important innovation
center for technological development and new products. The technopole plays an
important role in facilitating technology transfer and the commercialization of new
technology and products. It also provides a supportive environment for ventures and
small businesses.
In order for governments to realize the vision of planned technopoles, it is paramount
that the land use and economic planners understand the economic, social and
institutional conditions that enable knowledge-based economies to thrive. Often in a
planned technopole, the government typically plays multiple roles as a planner,
coordinator, initiator, operator and financial provider.
Defined as a cooperative relationship between two or more independent organization entities agreeing
to work together to achieve specific, predefined objectives (Tae Kyung Sung, 1999).
1.3 Literature Research: Concept of Clustering and Economic Development
The competitive advantage of regions can be linked to the theory of industrial clustering
as a growth system for economic development. A successful high-tech cluster can
"drive" economic development based on specialization, improving technological
capabilities, innovativeness, facilitate tacit knowledge flows and learning through
interaction (Castells and Hall, 1994, Porter, 1998, Saxenian, 2000, Amsden and Chu,
Forthcoming).
a) Advantages of industrial clusterinq
Porter popularized the theory that industrial clustering provides a competitive edge for a
region's economic development because:
"The enduring competitive advantages in a global economy are often
heavily local, arising from concentrations of highly specialized skills and
knowledge, institutions, rivals, related businesses, and sophisticated
customers. Geographic, cultural, and institutional proximity leads to
special access, closer relationships, better information, power incentives
and other advantages in productivity and innovation that re difficult to tap
from a distance. The more the world economy becomes complex,
knowledge based, and dynamic, the more this is true".
Thus, companies that are part of a cluster network can operate more productively in
sourcing inputs, information, technology, and institutions; coordinating with related
companies; and measuring and motivating improvement. In addition, clusters enhance a
company's ability to innovate. Peer pressure, pride, and the desire to look good in the
community spur executives to outdo one another. Through the interactions within the
cluster, insights and skills from various fields merge, sparking new businesses. While
such benefits can be reaped in regions with established agglomeration economies, the
formation of that initial cluster is often difficult in a latecomer country since they are not
at the technological frontier and they have much skill deficits.
b) Technopoles, the 2 1't Century Industrial Complexes
Thus, Castells and Hall emphasized that a latecomer country must accumulate
knowledge and improve its own technological capabilities in order to move from
industrial economy to a knowledge-based one. With increased knowledge, the
technological potential of countries and regions and their ability to produce the most
advanced technological products is enhanced. This constitutes having technological
inputs that will condition the improvement of products and processes in downstream
industries.
Castells and Hall advocated that countries should develop clear development strategies
to bring its current development level to the next. To build local competency in
technology, nations have to import technology while encouraging inward investment to
train its labor force. It is crucial to have sustainable source of innovation, synergy and
networks between different players in the technopole and a long-term vision to guide
development to ensure that the pre-conditions for "natural" growth of the technopole is
present. In selecting an appropriate location for a technopole, it must be sensitive to the
established research-industrial networks and synergy must be developed at the new
location on the outset.
c) Need for networkinq or synergy amongst players in the cluster
A key feature of cluster development is the formation of networks between different
entities of the clusters. Amsden and Chu had defined "network" as a locus of
transactions among firms that are mediated personally rather than anonymously, as they
supposedly are in market theory. There are two forms of networks:
i) Formal Networks e.g. subcontracting of parts of components, customization of
inputs that require close inter-firm cooperation, "in-processing" or local
procurement of peripherals from known suppliers, and
ii) Informal Networks e.g. interactions between businesses to exchange ideas, etc.
The stronger the networks, the more interactions there will be between firms within the
cluster, the more synergy will exist. It is advantages for a firm to locate in the technopole
because they can have access to latest knowledge and ideas, which help them to
develop proprietary knowledge-based asset and thus, higher profit margins for their
product.
1.4: Research Interest: Sustainable high-tech cluster development
There is a general consensus in literatures that economic clustering can provide an
environment that allows companies to increase their technological capabilities and
innovativeness through better knowledge flow. The emergence of planned technopoles
is government's reaction to jump-start the high-tech cluster formation process.
Many governments have used a "one size fits all" formula to develop their technopoles,
which consists of "a small dose of venture capital, a university, fiscal and institutional
incentives to attract high-technology firms, and a degree of support for small business"
(Castells and Hall, 1994). Such technopoles often fail, as it could not create any
innovation milieu, resulting in a waste of economic resources. Thus, I believe that
building a science city is much more complicated and requires a deeper understanding
of how high-tech clusters work before undertaking such projects. I am also interested in
studying technopole developments because Singapore is also in the process of
developing a US$9b Science Hub as part of its efforts to transform its economy into a
knowledge-based one.
In view of Singapore's efforts and the difficulties in developing successful technopoles,
the primary objective of my research is to establish and understand the critical success
factors underlying a successful high-tech cluster development. With this knowledge, I
can better make policy improvements to develop Singapore into a science city.
1.5: Methodology
This thesis uses Massachusetts's Route 128 high-tech corridor as an exemplary case
study to establish the set of success factors that allowed the economy to remain
competitive over the years. The hypothesis is that planned technopoles that have the
success factors are also more likely to become successful growth poles for its region
and vice versa. To test the hypothesis, the success factors identified will be tested
against 3 planned science city developments as follows:
a) Akademgorodok (Siberia)
b) Taedok Science Town (S. Korea)
c) Tsukuba Science City (Tokyo)
The central government was instrumental in deciding the "ingredients when developing
these science cities. Studying their development process allows a careful analysis of the
government's role, how different factors interact with each other and their outcome.
Specifically, each case study is chosen for the following reasons:
a) Akademgorodok Science City of Siberia
The planning for Akademgorodok Science City started in 1957 under the conditions of
total state control over research, industry, and spatial location. Although it was
developed before Route 128 or Silicon Valley became successful, I believe that the
same success factors would have to be present if this Science City is to be successful.
b) Taedok Science Town of South Korea
Taedok Science Town was developed (in the mid-1970s) from a direct presidential
decision to foster science and regional decentralization from Seoul. Taedok is located
100 miles (160km) south of Seoul in the middle of the Korean countryside of Taejon city.
Some literature had indicated that this research-based city was unable to facilitate
regional economic development. However, Taedok seems to play an increasingly
important role in South Korea in the 1990s. This case provides insight to the outcomes
of the science city when some factors are missing and whether the location of science
city matters in determining its success.
c) Tsukuba Science City of Japan
Tsukuba Science City, which was conceived in 1961, was Japan's first attempt to build a
science city. Tsukuba is located just outside Tokyo and is to be the national research
center of Japan. It had little private enterprise within the Science City. This case shows
whether a concentration of national research institutes alone was a sufficient "pull" factor
for a technopole to develop
CHAPTER 2: MASSACHUSETTS ROUTE 128
2.1 Introduction
Although Route 128 only shot to fame in the 1960s, the foundation for its success was
laid long before WWII. In the 1800s, New England pioneered technologically innovative
production methods and equipment for textile, machine tools industries. Despite losing
its traditional industries to other lower-wage regions in the early 1900s, it managed to re-
industrialize repeatedly in different industries thereafter to maintain its position as one of
the most innovative industrial hub in the world.
In particular, the establishment of MIT in 1861 signified the region's long industrial
tradition. MIT was to be "an industrial institution designed for the advancement of the
industrial arts and sciences and practical education in the Commonwealth" (Pg 46,
Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992). MIT had taken pro-active steps to work with the
industries' and had been more open to accepting research contract from private
industrialist. By the 1930s, MIT was an elite academic institution and had the oldest and
most distinguished electrical engineering department in America.
2. 2 Key events between 1940s and 1980s
In the 40s - start of intensive military research
The revolutionary occurrence in the industrialization history of Massachusetts in the last
few decades could be traced back to World War II. This international event spurred
unparalleled economic growth in the Greater Boston region.
Government-funded research and economic activities
Because of MIT's capability as a top engineering school in America and its close
relationship with Washington DC2, it became the nation's leading research center during
the war, performing more military research than other US universities. MIT's laboratories
received one-third of the $330m in contracts that was awarded by the Office of Scientific
Research and Development (OSRD) during the 1940s and 1950s to research in the
emerging fields of radar, missile guidance and navigational systems, etc. (Saxenian,
1994). Other universities in the Boston area received substantially lesser research funds.
It was during this time that the relationship between science and government was
revolutionized; government funds universities to do research instead of internalizing
research work within government labs.
1 For example, in 1910, Donald Jackson, the chair of electrical engineering department, appointed an
advisory committee made up of top executives from major corporations such as GE and Westinghouse.
The university also set up a Division of Industrial Cooperation and Research in the 1920s (later renamed
to Office of Sponsored Projects) to solicit corporate research contracts and keep companies apprised of
MIT research findings (Saxenian, 1996, pg 13).
2 Vannevar Bush, who served President Roosevelt as the Director of the newly formed Office of Scientific
Research and Development (OSRD), was an EE professor at MIT before he went to Washington.
Subsequent MIT professors who became science advisers to the President include James Killian (1940,
Truman), Jerome Wiesner (1960, Kennedy), Lee Du Bridge (Nixon), Guyford Stever (Ford), Frank Carter
(Carter).
Because of government funding, MIT was able to engage in high-risk, high-cost basic
research i.e. scientific investigation that seeks to expand our fundamental knowledge
and understanding of human beings and the world around us. A consequence - and
often a motivation - of this understanding was the ability to alter or control some process
or phenomenon. Ultimately, when this ability was applied toward some useful end, a
technology was born. Basic scientific research was often, therefore, at the very root of
technology innovation (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992). The findings from basic research
were critical for the advancement of military technology and the commercial market. The
independence and freedom to explore the frontiers of knowledge without a guaranteed
payoff led to many unanticipated benefits, as seen from the number of spin-off
companies founded by MIT researchers.
A typical example of this "multiplier effect" arising from a government-funded research
was from the research on radar and navigation system. MIT used government research
finds to set up Radiation Lab. Together with Harvard's labs which studied submarine
warfare and anti-radar systems, these research units created jobs and drew top
physicists and electronics engineers from across the country. Many of these skilled labor
remained as university researches and faculty, or as employees in local companies,
after the war.
The local industry benefited from this research. Raytheon, a small company then, was
awarded government contracts to produce tubes and magnetrons for radar services.
Within a short period of 5 years, its sales grew from $3m to $173m and its employment
grew from 1,400 to 16,000 (Saxenian 1994). By the 1950s, Raytheon could diversify into
other areas such as developing missile guidance system. By the end of the war, the
Boston area, together with its numerous research labs, renowned universities like MIT,
Harvard and other local universities, offered an intellectual and technological labor pool
unsurpassed in the world.
Rise of Venture Capitalists
The setting up of company is contingent on the availability of funding. In 1925, when
Raytheon went into the manufacturing of vacuum tube for radios, it was funded with
investments from J P Morgan and an informal group of wealthy Bostonians. Other
technology start-ups during this period such as Polaroid and National Research
Corporation also relied on local individuals for financing (Saxenian, 1994).
In the 1940s, formal venture capital markets started to form. In 1946, a group of New
England financiers and academics, including MIT President Karl T. Compton, organized
the American Research and Development Corporation (ARD) to supply capital to
research-based enterprises seeking to exploit the new technologies developed during
the war. ARD became the first publicly held venture capital company in the nation. The
company actively pursued investment opportunities at MIT and its labs4 . The early
successes of ARD-funded enterprises encouraged the region's banks and insurance
companies to invest in high-tech firms (Saxennian 1994, pg 15). Private investment also
3 Basic research is a scientific investigation that seeks to expand our fundamental knowledge and
understanding of human beings and the world around us.
4 ARD's funded companies included High Voltage Engineering Co., Tracerlab, and DEC.
increased significantly after that, with the First National Bank of Boston5 serving as an
intermediary between aspiring entrepreneurs and wealthy families such as Rockefellers,
Whitneys and Mellons.
The First National Bank of Boston also formed its own investment company in 1957 and
became the nation's first Small Business Investment Corporation (SBIC). The Small
Business Investment Act provided tax benefits for companies that invested in small
business. Former employees of ARD and the First National Bank of Boston
subsequently set up more venture capital firms. As observed by Dorfman, "it appears
that in the postwar era, new firms were in a better position to find venture capital in
Boston than in many other parts of the country" (Lampe, 1988).
In the 1950s & 60s - the boom period
Although the war had ended, military research grew at the onset of Cold War, Korean
War and the space race. These two decades saw a growth in the number of spin-off
firms, and the development of computer technology at MIT.
On-going basic research
In 1951, MIT established Lincoln Lab at the request of the Air Force to develop long-
range radar, air defense warning systems and high-speed digital data processors
(Saxenian 1994). MIT's Instrumentation Lab (now Charles Stark Draper Lab), which
developed aircraft and missile navigational equipment, began devising missile guidance
systems for air defense for the space race. The MITRE Corporation, a spin-off of MIT's
Lincoln Lab, worked on air defense and missile warning systems. The Air Force
Cambridge Research Laboratories, which grew out of the breakup of the Radiation Lab,
focused on radar and air defense. By mid 1960s, these labs jointly employed some
5,000 scientists and engineers.
Premises and infrastructure
In general, the state provided excellent building space at relatively low cost e.g.
abandoned mills, good surface and air transportation (reducing transportation cost and
providing certainty to production of goods) and attractive residential neighborhoods with
easy access to work sites. However, it was the completion of the first 27-mile (43.5km)
stretch of Route 128 in 1951 that opened up land resources for this growing research
and industrial activity.
"Route 128 was the foundation stone for the development of high
technology as we know it today. You couldn't possibly have put the
number of high-tech firms that located along (Route) 128 into existing
communities." (Pg 109, Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992)
Although Route 128 was never built with an objective to be a new high-tech corridor, it
opened up a vast amount of land in the Greater Boston Area for new start-up companies
to locate within a short drive of MIT. Within a few years, Route 128 attracted a diverse
mix of research labs, branches of established corporations and start-ups. "By 1961,
there were 169 establishments employing 24,000 people located directly on the
highway, and at least as many again nearby that considered themselves Route 128
5 First National Bank of Boston was renamed BankBoston. Subsequently, BankBoston merged with Fleet
Bank and is now operating under the registered mark of FleetBoston Financial Corporation.
firms. In 1965, MIT researchers counted 574 companies in the region, and the number
more than doubled in the following eight years" (Pg 16, Saxenian, 1994).
Entrepreneurial culture - spin-offs
The universities generated the ideas for new businesses; the federal government
concentrated personnel and money on specific projects; and investors put their faith and
dollars behind hundreds of risky start-ups. The high-tech network and its coherent
pattern of innovation began with the entrepreneurs who had the guts, the vision and the
perseverance to try an idea out on the marketplace and sometimes, to make it work. The
innovative ideas - sparked by the interactions of people and organizations - bring spin-
offs into new products and enterprises.
Start-ups came from spin-offs from research labs and established companies. The joint
efforts of the federal government and MIT during WWII spawned hundreds of new
products and companies. MIT engineering department and research labs spawned at
least 175 new enterprises during the 1960s, including 50 from Lincoln Lab and another
30 from the Instrumental Lab. Raytheon had close to 150 start-ups. The electronics
division of Sylvania (a national corporation) spawned another 39 (Saxenian, 1994).
These start-ups were heavily supported by military and aerospace contracts.
Spin-off from other companies was also a critical growth factor in the Route 128 area
from the 1960s up to the 1980s. Often, as soon as a company establishes the viability of
the marketplace it was pursuing, its key employees began breaking loose to try to do it
better on their own. In most cases, these fledging entrepreneurs stayed in the
neighborhood, relying on the same network of customers, suppliers, and friends who
had supported them in their previous jobs.
Development of computer technology
One of the most direct connections between MIT-induced wartime programs and the
subsequent development of Boston's high-tech industries was the development of a
computer science capability at MIT.
Jay W Forrester, a researcher at MIT, started the development of this technology when
he tried to find means to solve complex simulation problems for aviation. As he required
a fast operating system to do the numerous simulation problems, he started Whirlwind
Computer Project. After developing it, he sold it to Pentagon as the core of a system to
build "electronic radar fence" (SAGE). Forrester was looking for a commercial
manufacturer to build his iron core memory for the SAGE project and chose IBM - by
pure chance. From then on, IBM moved to computer manufacturing. On the basis of
SAGE contract, IBM hired 8000 engineers and workers, signaling its real head start in
computer manufacturing with its Model 650, delivered in Dec 1954 (Pg 34, Castells and
Hall, 1994). Ken Olsen, a MIT researcher at the Lincoln Lab who was attached to IBM to
manufacture the iron core memory, came out and set up his own computer company,Digital Equipment Corporation, in 1957 which went on to become one of the largest
electronic computer companies. Other companies that were set up in the 1950s to
capitalize on this new technology include Wang Laboratories, Computer Control
Corporation, etc.
As observed by Castells and Hall, "a new industry (computer science) grew out of new
knowledge created by Academic. But this knowledge was nurtured by Pentagon financial
and institutional support." This new technology was improved in subsequent years to
develop the minicomputer (see below).
In the 1970s - the "Massachusetts Miracle" years
By 1970, the Route 128 region had established itself as the nation's leading center of
innovation in electronics, which required high levels of skill and constant innovation.
However, several events made the 1970s an "unclear" period in terms of economic
dynamism of high-tech companies.
Recession and unfavorable business policies
In 1970, US slipped into a recession that jacked up nationwide unemployment into a
temporary high of about 6% in 1971. In Massachusetts, unemployment kept climbing
until 11.2% in 1975 (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992). Massachusetts was doubly affected
as military spending in the early 1970s also reduced due to the end of Vietnam War and
slowdown in the space war. These concurrent events affected both the traditional
manufacturing business and high-tech industries that had since grown dependent on the
low-risk government military contracts for business. Between 1970 and 1972, Raytheon
alone laid off 10,000 workers (40% of its staff) (Saxenian, 1994).
To keep the tax revenue up, the capital gains tax and income tax in Massachusetts were
increased substantially in the 1970S6, making Massachusetts uncompetitive. This
taxation policy was a single most unfavorable factor in attracting talented people into
Massachusetts. At the same time, the high capital gains tax reduced incentives to take
on high-risk high-tech businesses. The recessions of 1970 and 1974 effectively dried up
whatever enthusiasm left for Massachusetts's venture capital and new public offering on
the stock market. In addition, what little venture capital that was left went to the flashier
Silicon Valley area, which was starting to have a higher profile than Route 128.
Economic recovery and increased defense expenditure
By 1975, the nation was climbing out of recession and the government spending on
military research increased again under the Reagan administration. With the painful
lesson of over-relying on Defense contracts, Route 128 businesses started to shift
towards the commercial markets, overshadowing the effects of an increased military
spending. While in most literature, the 70s was a lull period for Route 128 companies,
small firm formation was actually rife in the late 70S7. It was also this time that
Massachusetts experienced growth in the more commercially focused high-tech sector
(especially in minicomputers) that eventually pulled Route 128 out of its recession. In the
period between 1975 and 1988, the unemployment rate dropped from 11.2% to 2.7% -
this phenomenal achievement is known as "The Massachusetts Miracle".
The commercialization of minicomputers and firm formation (entrepreneurship)
Minicomputer, like other important postwar technologies, was developed through the
combined efforts of military funding and university research. While basic computing
research was carried out at MIT in the postwar decades, the task of refining the
6 In 1969, Capital Gain Tax increased from 25% to 49.2% and a "temporary" 7.5% surcharge on state
income taxes was imposed between 1975 and 1986. (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1994).
7 "Only 351 high-tech companies founded during the "booming" 1960s, but there were 638 surviving
companies formed during the "depressed" 1970s.... most were relatively small operations, often privately
held, that could rely on their own resources." (Pg 128, Rosegrant and Lampe, 1994)
computer for military application was passed to Lincoln Lab, where they were exploring
ways to make computers smaller and more versatile.
By the mid-1970s, the nation emerged from its recession with a new generation of
improved minicomputers bursting onto the marketplace. DEC was able to produce low-
cost minicomputers in large volumes and was leading the market with more than 40%
worldwide sales (Saxenian, 1994). Other leading minicomputer makers in the region
include Data General, Prime and Wang. "As a broad range of industries embraced
computer technology, the potential for both hardware and software companies seemed
limitless" (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992).
The formation of computer ventures based in Massachusetts accelerated from the 1960s
through to the 1970s. Altogether, 48 new computer-related companies were formed
within these two decades. As spin-offs from existing high-tech firms increased,
successful firms became role models for others hoping to try their hand at
entrepreneurship. High-tech employment shot up by more than 47% from 1975 to 1983
and roughly 75% of the state's high-tech manufacturing jobs were in electronics and
"office machinery", which included computers. However, the most growth came from the
"services" sector, which increased by 46% between 1975 and 1983, and employed more
people in the state by 1983 than any other job category (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992).
Effective Networking
With the growth of minicomputer companies, the local supplier base also expanded. The
supplier base expanded to include job shops supplying custom circuit boards, electronic
components, precision machinery, metal parts, and subassemblies that were critical for
developing prototypes and short product runs. The region also became the home of
scores of technical and management consulting firms and other providers of business
services. This infrastructure was an important resource that supported both established
firms and start-ups (Saxenian, 1994). Firms could get what they want quickly without
much traveling. For example, although parts could be ordered out-of-state, having
supporting firms near the industry became crucial at design stage and was required out
of necessity instead of convenience. The availability of scientists and researchers also
augment the supply.
By the late 1970s, members of the high-tech community begun to form trade
associations to discuss common interests and to boost their political clout. Bankers,
lawyers, public relations firms, and real estate companies were tailoring their services to
meet the special demands of this pool of increasingly powerful and prosperous client. In
addition, the state initiated a series of programs to recognize and encourage
technological growth.
Through the years from 1940s - 1970s, the network of interconnected and
interdependent goods and services critical in the high-tech sector became almost self-
sustaining. As observed in Rosegrant and Lampe, the university services are not the
magnet now. The "Mecca syndrome" is that there are a lot of people, a lot of companies
in the Boston area and "the combination of venture capital, great schools and a heritage
of successful companies now feeds on itself". Together, they form a particular
environment of the Route 128 area, one that drew existing companies from across the
countries and even from overseas.
In the 1980s - Personal Computers
The industry-driven miraculous boom experienced in Massachusetts eventually "burst" in
the 1980s due to several factors. The changing technologies, aggressive global
competition, nationwide economic decline and greed all contributed to the decline in
economic activities for the area.
Smaller pool of venture capital funds
By the late 1980s, venture capitalist had started to shift away from small, high-tech start-
up and increasingly putting their funds into different kinds of deals (including non-
technical companies) or more mature high-tech companies. Thus, it was harder for start-
ups to get funds.
"Get rich quick" mentality
During the miracle years, this mentality spread among many would-be entrepreneurs,
developers and already well-to-do venture capitalists. They were inspired by the many
successful people who had reaped fortunes and jumped onto the bandwagon of
investing in high-tech companies. It was thus easy to get money to start a business,
despite the weak viability of the business. The high demand also resulted in inflated
valuation of the high-tech stocks, which could not be supported. Thus, in the late 80s,
when there was no eager public market to snap up start-up shares, many entrepreneurs
found the going particularly tough (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992).
Changing technologies and autarchic business style
As Massachusetts boomed in the late 70s and early 80s, Silicon Valley was also growing
as a technological region. However, -Massachusetts had been looking inwards by
concentrating on the development of minicomputers that it "missed out" on the
semiconductors and personal computers wave that were so rife in Silicon Valley. There
was a fundamental shift in technology: The minicomputer was out and personal
computers and workstations were in. In addition, most Massachusetts computer makers
had an outdated strategy. Each maker had in-house developed machines and softwares
that were not compatible with other manufacturers' products. It made them inflexible and
when personal computers emerged, minicomputers were "out of fashion". Between 1989
and 1991, minicomputer makers lost more than 40,000 jobs.
2.3 The secret of Route 128's success -- Success Factors
From 1940 to 1990, the Boston area saw two waves of reindustrialization. The first round
took place in the 1950s, and was directly linked to military and space programs that
concentrated the research and manufacturing activities in the state. The second round
took place between 1975 and 1985 and relied on the computer industry as its new
industrial base. The growth of this new industry is linked to the growth of one particular
product - minicomputers. During these periods, some of the largest and most innovative
companies in the world e.g. DEC, Data General, Wang Laboratories, Prime Computers,
Computervision, were founded and remained there.
2.3.1 Strong Science Base, Skilled workforce, Ability to attract key staff,Availability of research funds
The Boston area's extensive research and educational infrastructure was the key to the
region's ability to innovate. The extensive network of prestigious private universities,
hospitals, federal laboratories and other research institutions drew some of the best and
brightest students, faculty, and researchers from all over the world into the Boston area.
The region's schools provided students with training in the latest technologies, and the
network of research institutions and research-oriented firms gave many of them an
opportunity to test their skills. These graduates carried new skills to jobs and transferred
technology. The principal output of this infrastructure was people with expertise and
ideas. The universities also provided the full range of professionals - including scientists,
engineers, medical doctors, lawyers, venture capitalists, and managers - required to
sustain a high-tech community.
High-tech spin-off was an effect of the congregation of talents in the region, and the
diversity of research that were underway. Many spin-off firms were strongly research
oriented, taking advantage of the skills found locally, and doing business with the federal
government, universities, and the research community. They provided a continuum of
research-oriented organizations that helped to ease new technologies into the market.
Above all, there were sufficient federal funds to allow an abundance of continuous basic
research to be carried out. To a certain extent, all basic innovation was carried out by
military research contract given by the government. Early economic development was
then built on these new military research findings. Such research was unlikely to be
carried out by the private companies. Thus, the government-backed research fueled the
research and knowledge generation process, and facilitated spin-off formation.
2.3.2 Availability of funds for start-ups
Based on BankBoston's (now Fleet Bank) 1993 survey of 883 high-tech companies
founded by MIT graduates, it discovered that the greatest obstacles to success in the US
domestic market was the difficulty in obtaining funding and government regulations (see
Chart 2.1).
Chart 2.1: Obstacles to success in national markets
Difficulty in Obtaining Finance 12.2
Government Regulations | 2.07
Intellectual Property Rights violations 10.76
Cultural Differences 0.52
Other non-Tariff Trade Issues 0.3
Tariffs 0.2
Others 0.81
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
E Average ranking [1 (lowest) to 5 (highest)]
Source: BankBoston, 1993
For Route 128, the availability of venture capitalists in the 1940s and its growth in the
subsequent decades helped spin-offs to form. However, as the venture capitalist market
matures and becomes more sophisticated in its investment strategy, it is no longer easy
for start-ups to obtain funding and thus retarded its formation.
Venture capitalist follows the "booming" areas. In the 1980s when Massachusetts was
experiencing an economic downturn and Silicon Valley was recovering rapidly, the
Boston-based venture capitals moved their funds to the Bay Area. During the 1980s,
Massachusetts-based companies received $3b in venture capital, while firms in Northern
California received $9b (Saxennian, pg 106). Thus, venture capitalist facilitates firm
formation, but will never lead such activities.
2.3.3 Supportive Policy Environment
The Route 128 high-tech community was not planned and the government did not
actively reduce unfavorable business regulations to stimulate economic development.
However, the fact that so many companies were willing and able to set up companies in
the Boston region showed that the business environment and the policies affecting
businesses in the area must have been sufficiently pro-business. The unfavorable tax
policies in the 1970s, which temporarily kept labor and businesses away from Route
128, showed the negative impacts such "un-probusiness" policies could have on the
competitiveness of a region.
One other policy that facilitated Route 128's development was MIT's charge to
encourage strong interactions with the industry. This allowed industries to tap the
Institute's expertise and to carry out research and development, which would otherwise
not be done. This made it advantages for firms to locate in the Boston area. Similarly,
the government commitment to the various research programs resulted in the numerous
discoveries and innovations, spin-offs and job creation.
2.3.4 Availability of premises and infrastructure
The completion of the first section of Route 128 was on cue with the area's first high
technology explosion after WWII. "The opening of Route 128 seemed like tossing candy
to a pack of hungry kids" (Pg 109, Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992). The expanding high-
tech community was in need of cheap premises with good transportation network to set
up their businesses in. Especially for start-ups, the availability of cheap premises is
critical to its success. Thus, this highway, which suddenly exposed acres and acres of
land a mere 15 to 20-minute commute to MIT and Harvard definitely facilitated the
growth of the community. As Route 128 became more congested, many companies
started to move to locate along Route 495, which is approximately 25 miles from Boston.
Other moved even further to Worcester, New Hampshire or back into Cambridge, like
Kendall Square area. The entire Greater Boston region thus formed a physical
concentration of high-tech companies.
2.3.5 Entrepreneurial Culture
Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew observed the following entrepreneurial
culture in the US:
"The US has been the most dynamic society in innovating, in starting up
companies to commercialize new discoveries or inventions, thus creating
new wealth. American society is always on the move and changing. They
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have led the world in patents, striving to produce something new or do
something better, faster and cheaper, increasing productivity. Having
created a product that sold well in America, they would then market it
worldwide." (Straits Times Interactive, Feb 6 2002)
The innovative environment is evident in Massachusetts. Particularly in MIT, the seed of
entrepreneurship was planted in its students through its curriculum structure and the
students' access to cutting-edge technology encouraged them to become risk-takers.
The 1993 BankBoston study showed that MIT-related companies had more than 8,500
plants and offices in the US8. If these companies formed an independent nation, the
revenues produced would make that nation the 24h largest economy in the world. The
types of companies MIT graduates created tended to be knowledge-based companies in
software, manufacturing (electronics, biotech, instruments, machinery) or choosing(architects, business consultants, engineers) and highly dependent on a workforce of
skilled professionals. These companies had a disproportionate importance to their local
economies because they usually sold to out-of-state and world markets.
The usual mindset of MIT students was to "take the risk of failure than the risk of
becoming a nobody" (BankBoston, 1993). The learning process at MIT was a "hands-on"
process. Because of the research-industrial ties, MIT students could work on "real stuff."
Students were "right in the middle of something big" i.e. topics being argued about and
worked on at that moment in the industrial world. The ties forged at MIT with fellow
students were also crucial in forming future networks i.e. customer or cofounders. As
described in the BankBoston report,
"MIT offers great mentors (professors) and more opportunities(professors' consulting/research activities) for students to test the water in
establishing their own businesses. MIT exposes students to cutting edge
technologies and new ideas. It probably is easier to explore business
potential of these new ideas and technologies as entrepreneurs. It seems
to be quite natural that MIT becomes a cradle of entrepreneurs."(BankBoston, 1993)
The university researchers were also trained to be entrepreneurs. To compete for
federal research funds, they must submit their ideas and propose research plans to
appropriate agencies for peer evaluation and approval. This compelled researchers to
articulate the importance of their work and forced them to be entrepreneurs. The labs
became springboard / breeding ground for entrepreneurship.
Massachusetts was also "importing" company founders as a result of MIT. While only
9% of MIT undergraduates were from Massachusetts, more than 42% of the software,biotech and electronics founded by MIT graduates are located in the state. The 1,065
MIT-related firms headquartered in Massachusetts, which accounts for 10% of the
state's economic base, employ 353,000 people worldwide and 125,000 people in the
state (BankBoston, 1993).
8 The main locations of companies founded by MIT graduates are as follows: California (162,000),Massachusetts (125,000), Texas (84,000), New Jersey (34,000) and Pennsylvania (21,000).(BankBoston, 1993).
2.3.6 Extensive business support services and networks
A key feature within cluster development is the formation of networks between different
entities of the clusters. It took effort, focus, and infusion of federal funds during the war
years to ignite Boston's high-tech community, but a network had begun to evolve. As the
high-tech cluster developed, supporting services such as patent agents, lawyers,
recruitment and property advisors etc formed, reinforcing the high-tech community's
presence there. The opportunities for researchers, companies and others to meet and
exchange views and information, as well as undertake a range of activities to promote
the industry facilitated "ideas generation" and ultimately, the rate of growth of the area.
2.4 Lessons from Route 128
Despite the economic success of Route 128, its development was not without fault.
From the temporal economic downturn in the 70s and 80s, several weaknesses could be
found.
2.4.1 Over-reliance on federal contracts
The high-tech community of Massachusetts grew primarily with the influx of military
contracts, making the companies rely more on federal contracts for business. In fact,
many companies were formed primarily to serve the government sector's demand for
electronic and military goods. This caused Massachusetts companies to become
uncompetitive and vulnerable to changes in government spending. Therefore, once the
government spending declined, companies that did no commercial work suffered, as can
be seen, from the many company close-downs as a consequence from the dwindling of
war activities in the 70s.
2.4.2 Inability to adapt quickly to changing technologies
During the 1980s, Silicon Valley caught up with its Route 128 counterpart. By 1990, 39
of the top 100 fastest-growing electronics companies in the nation were based in Silicon
Valley and only 4 were based in Route 128 (See Chart 2.2). Silicon Valley also
generated much start-up in the 1980s e.g. Sun Microsystems, etc.
Chart 2.2: No. of fast-growing electronics firms
between 1985 and 1990
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Route 128 experienced economic downtown then because it failed to shift from
minicomputers to personal computers and workstations, missing the entire Silicon
Valley's personal computer technology. The cause of the divergence in economic
performance in Massachusetts and Silicon Valley was neither due to an absence of a
local semiconductor industry9 in Massachusetts nor regional differences in real estate
costs, wages, or tax levels. In fact, Silicon Valley had a relatively high-cost location. It
was also not due to changes in defense spending since military spending in Route 128
in the 1980s was increasing.
According to Saxenian, Route 128's failure was primarily due to the region's industrial
system. Many of Route 128's technological capabilities were "locked-up" within large
firms and thus not available to start-ups or local producers. Silicon Valley's network-
based economy was more fluid socially. Its industrial structure was characterized by a
network of specialized small firms, resulting in a variety of companies and a high level of
formal and informal networking among companies in technical fields. Silicon Valley's
venture capital community also promoted this horizontal integration by encouraging
companies in their portfolios to work together.
Route 128, on the other hand, was characterized by independent, large scaled firms,
which could not adapt quickly to changing environment, although it had economic scale
and organization stability (Saxennian, 1994). The hierarchies within the Boston
companies were also extremely rigid. The manager created firms with complex and
sophisticated organizational patterns that employed individuals who were loyal to the
company. Employees expected that hard work would enable them to stay employed in
the firm and rise through the ranks, culminating in retirement with a large pension.
Employers are generally wary of hiring an engineer or programmer who has left another
firm after only a few years. Significant status differences also exist. The hierarchy of
positions and the means of formal communication within the firm, along with the
structure of salaries and benefits, resulted in strong delineations within the firm 0 . Thus,
while Route 128's skill base and supplier infrastructure were more superior to most
regions, they were neither as technologically sophisticated nor as diversified as Silicon
Valley's by mid 1980s. This ultimately made start-ups and small firms in Route 128 less
competitive as they were unable to learn about or acquire state-of-the-art components or
services as rapidly as their West Coast counterparts.
"DEC, Raytheon and Data General all had in-house chip facilities.
10 At DEC, for example, the company centralized many of its prominent functions and a small group ofindividuals made the decisions, namely Ken Olson (the CEO). The companies attempt to internalize many
of their procedures. This vertical integration often includes: software design, component, peripheral, and
subsystems production, and final assembly. Similarly, Apollo (minicomputer company at Route 128) was
committed to developing a proprietary operating system and hardware for its minicomputers, making itsproducts incompatible with other machines. As compared to Sun Microsystems (a PC firm in SiliconValley), who pioneered open systems, they used standard, readily available components, and relied on
outside suppliers even for design and manufacture of their reduced instruction set computing
microprocessor and encouraged them to market the chip to Sun competitors. As a result, Sun
workstations, while vulnerable to imitation by competitors, were also significantly cheaper to produce andlower priced than the proprietary Apollo systems (Saxenian, 1994).
2.5 Evaluation Framework
The success factors of Route 128 are captured in Figure 2.1 Each player has particular
"contributions" i.e. success factors that made it a developmental force. The professors,
students and researchers in the universities and research institutes devote their energies
towards research and development and make new discoveries. The government
provided the required support for the research. The firms would then produce the
physical manifestations of these discoveries for the marketplace. However, no matter
how strong each isolated organization was, what was much more important was the
strength of the connection between them. In fact, the triangle exists at all only if the
connections were there.
Figure 2.1: Relationship between Academia, Industry and Government
in Route 128 and its success factors
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES OF PLANNED SCIENCE CITIES
"Who will first make the future happen, and who will lead the world?
The one who innovates in science and technology will."
KAIST
3.1: Introduction
All three technopole case studies, Akademgorodok, Taedok and Tsukuba Science
Cities, have an emphasis on achieving scientific excellence by generating synergistic
research activities and housed many research organizations and scientists within a high-
quality urban space. In all the case studies, the government aims to build a community
of researchers and scholars in an area isolated from the rest of the society, or at least
from its vibrant urban centers.
In evaluating the case studies, the framework in Figure 2.1 will be used as a "checklist"
to assess whether these factors were similarly critical in determining the success of a
planned high-tech cluster.
3.2: Case Study 1: Akademgorok Science City (Siberia) - "academic little village"
3.2.1 Vision for Akademgorodok and its planning
One of the problems facing the Soviet Union in the 1950s was how to achieve rapid
development in Siberia to transform it into a productive force in the eastern part of the
country. When Khrushchev visited United States in 1957, he was impressed by the
quality of American research universities, and the role of campus life in creating a
research environment. Lavrentiev, a prominent Russian physicist and mathematician,
advised him to build a new scientific city in Siberia. This science city would concentrate
some of the best talent in the Soviet Union to undertake scientific research. They would
link research with industrial enterprises to modernize the Soviet industry (Castells and
Hall, 1994).
A site in the middle of the birch forest, approximately 15 miles (25 km) from Novosibirsk
(the main industrial center of Siberia), was chosen for Akademgorodok Science City (see
Appendix 1). It was the first time when a big center of science was created far from
Moscow or Leningrad. With a new area and new research institutes with greater
autonomy and considerable resources, Khrushchev hoped to provide opportunity for the
new generation of scientists whose creativity was hampered by established senior
academicians in the main science centers of Moscow and Leningrad (Castells and Hall,
1994).
To provide impetus to decentralize Soviet science to Akademgorodok, the Siberian
Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences (SBRAS) was created to be located in this new
science city. The goal of the SBRAS is to "intensify development of theoretical and
experimental studies in physical, engineering and natural sciences, and economics to
solve the major scientific problems and to promote build up of productive forces of
Siberia and the Far East" (SBRAS, 1998). Novosibirsk State University, which is now
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one of Russia's top universities, was also set up as a research university to train and
provide the researchers, engineers and technical personnel that the research institutes
needed.
When Akademgorodok was completed in 1958, it had an elite university, and about 20
large research institutes of the SBRAC (see Appendix 1). These institutions formed the
work place for about 7,500 scientists, 3,500 students, 1,500 university staff members
and several thousand workers and technicians employed by the research institutes. By
1990, about 70,000 residents of the 1,500,000 people in the Novobirsk region live in
Akademgorodok (Pg 41, Castells and Hall, 1994). The city was self-contained, equipped
with residential cottages/apartments, community facilities such as sports hall, stadium,
swimming pool, hotel, musical school, etc
3.2.2 Development of Akademgorodok Science City
An important factor during Akademgorodok's initial years was its enthusiastic and
talented labor force. Lavrentiev and a group of prominent scientists convinced gifted
researchers to move from the country's western regions to Akademgorodok; the elderly
scientists moved to Siberia to start a completely new enterprise while the young, bright
scientists wanted to work in a more favorable environment, away from Moscow's
bureaucracy. For a period of time, Akademgorodok had a science base that was infused
with unusual vitality and creativity. The numerous seminars, talks and social functions
facilitated social interaction and passionate discussions amongst scientists.
Apart from being a critical research center, Akademgorodok was to be the intermediary
between fundamental research and production. Unfortunately, the economic
development agency objected, deciding that industries should rely on their own research
facilities. The initial plan to locate industrial areas within this Science City was rejected
and consequently no industrial zone was planned (Castells and Hall, 1994). This lack of
industrial presence was "reinforced" by the lack of infrastructure connection with the
surrounding towns e.g. Novosibirsk. There was no train service, and only one road with
a public bus connection. The purpose was to preserve the social integrity of
Akademgorodok as a scientific community, separated from the industrial working-class
city of Novosibirsk (Castells and Hall, 1994).
Akademgorodok played a key role in rejuvenating the Soviet science. The state
increased its support for research that are important to national security (especially
nuclear physics and space research), international prestige, and economic growth.
Scientists increased their control over fundamental research. Khrushchev also
encouraged Soviet scientists to participate more regularly in international forums e.g.
Geneva conferences on atomic energy. Although government's research emphasis in
Akademgorodok was on applied research, it also pursued new and promising
fundamental projects (Josephson, 1997).
The situation changed in the 1970s under the Brezhnev regime. Brezhnev wanted to
reestablish the supremacy of the central party and was unable to accept the academic
freedom and free thought that symbolizes Akademgorodok. Thus, a direct effort was
made to end Akademgorodok's special status. SBRAS lost its unique scientist-
dominated organizational structure. The research institute became increasingly political
as communist party formed party organization in every institute. These organizations
controlled all research institutes' activities e.g. the conduct of research, hiring and firing
of individuals, researchers' personal lives, and any political and philosophical
discussions within the institutes. It was also more concerned with the formal aspects of
rule i.e. regular meetings, keeping records, attendance, etc than scientific achievements
(Josephson, 1997).
The Brezhnev regime also made it more difficult to obtain the research funding. Firstly,
all research projects had to be screened and approved by SBRAS. For economies of
scale, the government was more inclined to fund big projects e.g. nuclear fusion or
space research but not the more innovative, small-scale projects in sunrise fields e.g.
computers and biotechnology (Josephson, 1997). Secondly, in exchange for financial
support, policy makers expected scientists to be more accountable by conducting
research with short-time horizon for application to industry. This science-production
desideratum impacted the way scientists worked. As noted by Josephson, "soviet
scientists.... had to be discoverers, creators, innovators, entrepreneurs and salesmen all
wrapped into one.... only the rare individual had the time, the interest or the ability to go
to the factory laboratory or collective farm in order to promote industrial applications from
scientific discoveries ... Akademgorodok has grown out of a Russian tradition of
excellence in fundamental research.... Researchers lost their enthusiasm for work.
Accountability to the state weakened the fundamental basis that had been the strength
of Akademgorodok science" (Josephson, 1997).
Akademgorodok became increasingly provincial and isolated, as there was lack of
communication between institutes and industries. Between institutes, there was little
exchange as each institute was a self-sufficient entity, reporting only to SBRAS. They
became so isolated that each research institute had their own separate facilities e.g.
computer services, supply systems, libraries, etc instead of sharing facilities and
personnel (Castells and Hall, 1994). Even within each institute, there was little
interaction between different departments.
The continued lack of contact with industrialist in the Brezhnev regime resulted in one of
the main failures of Akademgorodok. After 30 years, there was almost total lack of
linkages with industrial enterprises, whether in Novosibirsk, in Siberia, or the Soviet
Union (Castells and Hall, 1994). Each research institute had its own industrial shop to
produce the machinery it needed for its experiments (Castells and Hall, 1994). In the first
five years of the 1960s, the Siberian division produced more than 350 innovations, but
many languished or were transferred to industry only on paper (Josephson, 1997).
On the part of the enterprises, there was also a lack of interest to acquire new
technology, as there was no need for it to meet their production quotas assigned under
Gosplan. Gosplan's calculation of production quotas was based on off-the-shelf
technology available in the international market and thus, the industries could copy or
buy Western machinery to modernize Soviet factories. This also undercuts any chance
for industrial application of Soviet academic research. Soviet industries e.g. electronic
machinery progressively became backward, which had huge impact both on the
productivity of industry and on the quality of scientific research (Castells and Hall, 1994).
Akademgorodok was also facing an array of housing and social problems, which the
SBRAS was not equipped to handle. These caused the scientists to move back to
Moscow and Leningrad (since they would be under equal intense control).
Approximately 100 to 150 nuclear physicists moved after staying in Akademgorodok for
less than 5 years. It was a 'double-blow' for Akademgorodok as it was both losing its top
scientists and was unable to recruit first-class young scientists to Siberia (Castells and
Hall, 1994).
After perestroika, the opportunities of the market mechanism revived enthusiasm and
great dreams in Akademgogorodok. The fact that the scientists knew they possessed
valuable knowledge that could result in personal rewards drew out their entrepreneurial
spirit. They collaborated with industries to sell their invention and the enterprises tried to
be more competitive by adapting their production method to new technologies.
Researchers established joint ventures with foreign companies to commercialize their
scientific discoveries abroad. Within a few years, the hundreds of spin-off companies in
Akademgorodok and Novosibirsk ramped up sufficiently to diversify their businesses and
start a process of long-term capital accumulation and reinvestment.
Business networks started to form. As noted in Castells and Hall, "cooperatives, self-
accounting units and sheer moonlighting enterprises started to proliferate in
Akademgorodok, after linking up with similar entrepreneurial ventures in Novosibirsk and
other Siberian cities. Start-up cooperatives and entrepreneurial individuals became
active hustlers in seeking foreign partners to finance projects to exploit their research in
the Academy's institute" (Ph 52, Castells and Hall, 1994).
The research environment also evolved to meet the needs of this new dynamism. Each
research institute became increasingly autonomous by setting up cooperatives to sell
their research to earn profits. Scientists need not follow any long-term plan or guidelines
of the SBRAS. Researchers used the facilities of the institutes to work on consulting jobs
outside. Although SBRAS's disapproved of such activities, they could do nothing to
control the researchers as "by the prevailing academic standards, they could achieve
above-average scientific productivity merely by doing some research in their spare time"(Pg 54, Castells and Hall, 1994). A new sense of vibrancy and excitement seemed to
surround the scientific institutions in Akademgorodok.
3.2.3 Lessons from Akademgorodok
Although Akademgorodok had achieved many scientific advances, it was also plagued
by years of decline in the 1970s and 1980s. The success and failures of this science city
are evaluated for each of the following periods:
a) Initial phase (early 60s)
b) Years of decline (70s and 80s)
c) After Perestrioka (90s)
a) Initial years
i Stronq science base and skilled workforce
The scientific city was an idea by an entrepreneurial government. The young and
renowned scientists in Akademgorodok were the foundation for a strong science
community. The universities provided the researchers and manpower to build a good
research center. The special status granted to Akademgorodok was important to
scientific research advancement, as it was facilitated networking and constant contact
with national and foreign researchers.
ii Lack of entrepreneurial culture and synergy
The ultimate decision not to actively promote synergy between Academia and Industry
proved costly. Although the impact of a lack of industrial presence was not apparent
initially, the effect was a technologically backward Soviet economy in later years. The
lack of firm formation in the initial years was due to a lack of market mechanism. Despite
a strong science base in Akademgorodok, the impact of scientific discoveries on industry
and economy was little.
Figure 3.1: Factors affecting development of Akademgorodok in the Initial Years
Entrepreneurial Culture
Quality Environment
Industrv
Proximity to research institutes/schools
Ability to attract key staff
Extensive business support services
and large companies in relateo
industries
Effective networks - collaborations with
industries
Availability of finance (for start-up)
b) Years of decline
i Unsupportive policy environment
In the 70s and 80s, the government's tight control policy "crippled" Akademgorodok's
vitality. The rigidity of the Russian economic and institutional systems made the research
institutes increasingly inward looking. The government's inability to solve the housing
shortage and social problems adds to Akademgorodok's unattractiveness. The narrow
and myopic government policies e.g. short-term research horizon, the government's
attempt to politicize and control research institutes directly affected the social fabric of
the city (e.g. by restricting foreign researchers, etc) and research activities. Ultimately,
these unfavorable policies created an environment that could not encourage synergy or
exchange of ideas between participants, which are critical to creating successful high-
tech communities (Josephson, 1997).
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ii No synerqy between Research Institutes and Industries
Paradoxically, despite government's beckoning for scientists to bring their innovations to
enterprises for application, there were almost no linkages established between research
institutes and industries. "The more the state required that Akademgorodok devote itself
to national development programs, the more it resembled that of institutes elsewhere in
Soviet Union and the less likely it would have significant impact on the production
process" (Pg 304, Josephson, 1997). Furthermore, the lack of basic research
compromised the long-term industrial development of the country. The outcome was the
isolation of research institutes (from industries and other research institutes) and a
striking paradox in Soviet science and technology: a strong scientific base coexisting
with increasing technologically backward industrial base.
Figure 3.2: Factors affecting development of Akademgorodok in Years of decline
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c) After perestroika
i Introduction of industry and rise of entrepreneurial sprit
The potential for growth and innovation had long been stifled by bureaucracy and
reinforced by apathy. The relaxed control of the SBRAS and influences of market forces
introduced new vibrancy into Akademgorodok. The prospect of reaping profits from their
knowledge was sufficient to turn scientists into entrepreneurs "overnight". Their efforts to
looked for enterprises and other research instiutes to "buy" their innovation and creating
spin-offs re-introduced industrial participation in science. With the establishment of some
commercial activities in Akademgorodok, supporting services developed to partake in
this new economy. Thus, networks formed to enable scientists, enterprises and
government to realize their own interests.
ii Synergy between academia, government and industry
Through such interactions between academia and industry, technology transfer from
research institute to industry and feedback from industry on innovation could occur.
Increased business opportunities motivated the link between science and business, thus
creating more spin-offs. More horizontal entrepreneurial networks formed and became
increasingly important. Although such vibrancy was not due to government efforts, the
relatively more relaxed controls were sufficient to create synergy between technology
and economy.
Figure 3.3: Factors affecting development of Akademgorodok after Perestroika
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After perestroika, the success factors of Route 128 "surfaced" and Akademgorodok
seemed closer to achieving its objectives to be a successful research science city and
an engine of economic growth for Russia.
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3.3 Case Study 2: Taedok Science Town (South Korea)
3.3.1 Vision for Taedok Science Town (TST) and its planning
South Korea is a country that has successfully industrialized from a rural agricultural
country in the early 1900s to an economy that is increasingly based on high-tech,
knowledge-based industries. The roots of its success can be traced to the efforts of a
"developmental state (that is) able and willing to increase the competitiveness of Korean
companies in the world economy by providing the necessary support in the form of
industrial and communications infrastructure, labor training, credit, trade policies and
science and technology" (Pg 57, Castells and Hall, 1994).
In the sixties, the South Korean economy was built around light industry, relying on
foreign capital and technology for economic growth. In 1970, rapid technology
advancement and global competition for newest technology was fierce. Technological
advancements made by foreign countries were becoming more difficult to access, and
Korea could no longer profit from its light industry. After assessing the situation, the
Korean government concluded that Korea should generate its own technology, and a
new research center would be the prime generator. The objective for the research center
was to develop Korea into one of the best countries in science and technology. This is
achieved through increased scientific research, technology development, and cultivation
of highly professional experts in science and technology. This meant concentrating
Korea's dispersed scientific and technological resources for greater efficiency.
In 1970s, a 2,760 ha of land in the middle of Korean countryside near the existing
industrial city of Taejon was selected for the science city development (see Appendix 2).
This site is approximately 160 km (100 miles) south of Seoul' and 30km away from the
nearest city i.e. Taejon. Taedok was to be a highly selective residential area, reserved
only for scientists and managers, who would enjoy excellent schools for their children
and better services than they had in Seoul. The level of physical infrastructure of Taedok
in 1988 is described in Castells and Hall as follows:
a) The town was served by an acceptable level of telecommunications infrastructure;
b) The main land uses for the city was reserved for educational and research facilities
and green area (see Appendix 2). The residential and scientific institutions were of
good construction and the town was built at very low density;
c) There were only two possible entry points into the town, both guarded by the army at
road checkpoints; and
d) The town was served by a Multiservice center, which included hospital, cafeteria,
post office, bank, pharmacy, shopping center, bookstore, indoor swimming pool, golf
course and a restaurant.
3.3.2 Development of Taedok Science Town
To jumpstart the project, the central government initially used incentives and good
working environment to attract potential tenants to TST. However, neither government
nor private institutions wanted to move Taedok. Thus, the government had to force
It is also 90 mins by train from Seoul, or 2hr 40 mins by limousine bus directly from Incheon International
Airport.
research institutes to relocate. The government first relocated four institutes from Seoul
to Taedok in 1978. By 1988, only about 17 research institutes had moved into Taedok
(see Table 3.1 below). Of the 17 research institutes, 14 of them are government or
government-related establishments and only 3 private industrial research institutes had
moved in. These institutes were compelled to relocate from Seoul because "they were
part of government or (in the case of the three private institutes) they were established
as a quid pro quo for government help for their parent corporations" (Castells and Hall,
1994). For the researchers who moved to Taedok, most kept their families in Seoul. The
researchers saw little advantage in locating in Taedok as the institutes have little contact
with each other.
Table 3.1: Composition of participants in TST
Number Personnel
1988 2000 1988 2000
Government-funded 9 20
Research Institutes
Private Research 3 29 7,000 14,444
Institutes (including (including 4,014
Government- invested 2 9 1,000 PhD Ph.D. degree
Research Institutes degree holders)
High Educational 3 4 holders)
Institutions
Public institutions NA 8
Total 17 70
Source: Castells and Hall (1994) and DSTA (2000)
Despite the relatively poorer quality of life in Seoul as compared to TST, the institutes
and firms were reluctant to move to Taedok because the real technopole was Seoul,
which had both a concentration of high-level engineers and scientists and easy
connections to the outside world of science of technology (Castells and Hall, 1994)
A key feature of the plan for TST was the lack of industrial activities (see land use chart
in Appendix 2). TST was a distinctive spatial unit, entirely segregated from nearby
urbanized areas. There seemed to be no connection between research activity and
production activities in the surrounding areas, even the relatively industrialized Taejon
(Castells and Hall, 1994). The lack of academic-industry synergy failed to create a
"milieu of innovation" in TST or achieve industry feedback on manufacturing or new
applications. As concluded by Castells and Hall, Taedok's initial development was
created by "force" from the government. "Taedok project appears as a purely political
decision, in the early 1970s by the then-President Park, to locate a new center of
excellence in his home province (Chungnam), so as to mark his efforts at
decentralization... Neither functionally nor industrially was Taedok a viable project" (Pg
63, Castells and Hall, 1994).
In the 1990s, the efforts of the government to recruit scientists and R & D labs (private
and public) from all over Korea into TST started to pay off. Since 1988, the number of
research institutes in TST increased substantially from 17 to 70 in 2000 to become the
largest research center in Korea (Table 3.1 and Appendix 2). The institutes and
organizations have also been employing more top scientists and engineers over the
years (Table 3.2).
The critical mass of scientists, engineers, students and research activities presented a
real opportunity for TST to be a high-tech cluster and a force for economic development.
The rate of growth of research institute setting-up in TST increased by five folds as
compared to the 1980s and the number of researchers employed in TST almost tripled
over the last period (Table 3.2). This signaled a possible change in attitude of the
scientists and institutions as they became more willing to locate in TST. The increase in
R&D investment over the years showed increasing vitality of R&D in TST.
Table 3.2: Growth of private sector R&D institutes in TST (compared to National)
Year 1981 1986 1991 1996 Growth Rate (%)
81-86 86-91 91-96
No. of private In TST 3 3 5 25 0 166 500
R&D labs (nation) (122) (290) (1109) (237) (382)
No. of 1390 1390 1666 4475 0 119 268
researchers (5054) (12,576) (28725) (248) (228)
Total 2783 2783 3235 9594 0 116 296
investment in (3423) (8521) (22640) (246) (265)
R&D
(bil won)
Source: Oh and Kang, 1999
For the universities, one of the most notable entries into TST is Korea Advanced Institute
of Science and Technology (KAIST). Formed in 1971, KAIST was the best research
university in South Korea and has founded more than 70 modern venture enterprises in
Korea (KAIST, 1998). Its entry into TST elevated TST's status as the center of science
and technology in South Korea and provided the necessary manpower and source of
spin-off companies for the area. In fact, many incoming firms had evaluated the location
of KAIST and ease of recruiting graduate as two of their main considerations before
settling in TST (Oh and Kang, 1999). Since KAIST relocated to TST, it has raised the
level of research activities and built closer linkages with other existing research centers
in Korea.
The government has been encouraging local research institutes to collaborate with
foreign research institutes to keep abreast of technological advances in the world. For
example, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) 2 has a
small office in San Jose (California) to support the dozen or more staff that are in the US
at any given time and also to act as a base for obtaining information about advanced
technology. In 1992, they opened a liaison office in Europe to support information
exchange, joint research, etc (David Kahaner, 1992). There are also a growing number
of foreign scientists and researchers in Taedok as a result of increased science and
research cooperation between TST and other countries, especially the US (TDAGS,
1995).
In recent years, the government (state and local) tried to link the innovative capability of
TST with local industrial development. To optimize their proximity to Taedok, the city of
Taejon tried to create more synergy between industries and academic by developing two
industrial districts next to TST: (a) The Taejon Science and Industrial Complex (TSIC)
and (b) Taejon Industrial Complex No 4 (Appendix 2). Taedok would serve as the
2ETRI is the R&D arm of Ministry of Science and Technology and focuses on IT, telecommunications,
computers, automation and semiconductors.
research base for these developments. TSIC was built as a local government initiated
public development plan funded by advanced payment of the companies renting space
in the complex. It was completed in 1999 and accommodates about 150 companies and
is a manufacturing base for chemistry, microelectronics, electronic controllers and
machines. TIC4 will accommodate about 90 companies producing machinery,
electronics, automobiles, textiles, food and beverages (TDAGS, 1995).
In 1989, the government unveiled its greater plans to develop four "Technobelts" across
South Korea to link up research and industry throughout the country via
telecommunications (Appendix 3). The aim was to create synergy between specialized
industries and research areas located within the same beltway. Through the epicenters
of each Technobelts, technological diffusion will take place to the industries along the
four major technobelts (Castells and Hall, 1994). TST thus play an important role in this
network of Technobelts as it is located at the crossroad of two belts.
Although Korea had created an extensive program to foster synergy between industry
and research centers, only about one-third of the research institutes had regular contact
with firms in Taejon i.e. undertaking collaborative research, technical supervision, etc
(Oh and Kang, 1999). Given that these improvement programs were implemented only
in the 1990s, it is likely that more time is required to realize the full potential. Thus, as
TST develops, it could have even greater effect on the economy.
Apart from building up a science case and improving academia-industry interaction, the
government also has an "Incubation Policy" to attract entrepreneurs from universities,
research institutes, and R & D centers to start their own companies. Incubation
institutions (Table 3.3) were formed to facilitate technology transfer to new firms,
commercializing new products, mediating between research institutions (universities and
research institutes) and private firms and supporting the creation of venture firms.
Table 3.3: Technology Business Incubator (TBI)
Incubating institution Venture Companies
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology(KAIST) 122
Electronic Telecommunication Research nstitute(ETRI) 83
Small & Medium Enterprise Support Center 24
Small & Medium Enterprise Support Center 18
Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology (KRIBB) 17
Korea Standardization and Science Research Institute 12
Korea Nuclear Energy Research Institute & 3 other institutes 24Total 300
Source: DSTA 2000
Since late 1980s, spin-off formation has been gaining momentum. There were 3 cases
of spin-offs in 1991, but it grew to 9 cases in 1995 and 20 cases in 1996 (Chart 3.1). Up
till 1998, 65 high-tech spin-offs were created from 9 organizations in TST, of which 8
were government related research institutes and 1 was private research institute (Oh
and Kang, 1999). The spin-offs created 954 new jobs in total (Chart 3.2). As observed by
Oh and Kang the spin-offs chose to locate in TST after gaining "independence" because
of the image that Taedok had gained as a high-tech cluster and the east of access to
technological information (Oh and Kang, 1999).
Chart 3.1: Number of Spin-offs in TST (Cumulative)
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The latest idea to facilitate start-up formation is Taedok Venture Techno Valley (TVTV).
This Valley is based on a comprehensive development concept of high-tech venture
business from the incubation stage to the mature stage. There are four areas to TVTV
development:
a) Area for post-incubators where the venture firms just "graduated" from
incubators, but are still at the development stage;
b) Area for high tech industries where the large firms could establish their
production plant and R&D facilities;
c) Area for supporting facilities where the total service of high-tech venture
business, prototype development, consulting firms, etc could be located; and
d) Area for housing estates where highly qualified manpower could have their
residence and community facilities (Oh and Kang, 1999).
In addition, TVTV promotes networking via the Network for Venture Community (NVC)
scheme. NVC creates a mutual information network that can be shared among research
institutes, universities in TST, government, and high-tech venture firms. NVC will have
an ideal venture community containing six sectors, namely
(a) Finance Support Sector,
(b) Basic Research Sector,
(c) Facility Support Sector,(d) Professional Support Sector,
(e) Strategy Support sector, and
(f) Education & Training Sector (Oh and Kang, 1999).
With the development of TVTV, TST will be one of the most attractive place for
entrepreneurs to locate their venture business.
TST also became a livable city with choice residential options for the thousands of well-
educated, highly qualified people in high-tech industries. As the community facilities are
developed and better quality schools provided, the work force in TST became more
willing to relocate the entire family into the science city, making it truly a place to work,
live and play. In 1995, 49% of the total number of researchers and workers resided
within TST (Table 3.4). The percentage of personnel living in nearby Taejon City and
Chungchong province had reached 32%. Only 7.4% of workers are living in outer areas
of Taejon City and Chungchong Province.
Table 3.4: Residential Location of Workers in TST
Within Taejon, Dormitory Other Total
TST Chungchong Areas
Public Institutes 41 345 47 14 447
Semi-Public Institutes 3694 2741 538 854 7827
Public Investment 754 561 97 92 150
Companies
Education Centers 1687 441 243 3 2374
Private Institutes 1582 1106 792 163 3647
Total 7758 5194 1721 1126 15799
(49%) (33%) (11%) (7%) (100%)
Source: Taedok Management Office, 1995
TST now has 3 parks, 2 athlete fields, 6 elementary schools, 5 middle schools and 5
high schools and shopping centers. The schools have become well known due to the
highly educated parents of these children. These children also have more opportunities
to mix with other children of different cultures since the researchers included foreigners.
Thus, TST has indeed transformed into a city that can attract highly educated workforce
to live and work.
3.3.3 Lessons from Taedok Science Town
The initial years was a time where TST was being developed by sheer governmental
force and had very little of the synergy that characterizes an innovative science city. In
the 1990s, it seemed that its development has achieved some momentum in being an
important research center and was gaining "success" in injecting vitality into the regional
economy. The development of TST will be evaluated in two sections:
a) Its initial years, from 1970s to late 1980s
b) Further development, from 1990 to 2000.
a) Initial Period
i Unable to build a strong science base
TST was unable to develop a strong science base because research institutes (public
and private) did not want to relocate there. Furthermore, the few institutes that relocated
did not work with each other to reap the potential benefits presented by being in close
proximity to each other. They refused to move because TST could not match the same
location advantage that Seoul offered in terms of economic network and concentration of
human capital. It would thus seem that Seoul is the "real" technopole that the Koreans
had unknowingly developed. Furthermore, the underdevelopment of social
infrastructures e.g. good schools, communal facilities, etc made it difficult for
researchers to relocate their families to TST. TST could only be a work place for
researchers during the weekdays; it remained far from being a real city where families
reside.
ii Lack of industrial presence and synergy with academia
The lack of interactions with industries hampered the "learning by doing" approach to
technological development that Korean had been relying on for decades. TST, isolated
from industrial establishments and nearby urban areas, was made even more
"unreachable" when the master plan provided only two guarded ingress and egress
points two and fro the science city. This discouraged any form of interactions with
establishments outside TST. Thus, instead of using TST to inject regional economic
dynamism, the government achieved the opposite: it helped establish an artificial
implant, without the capacity to promote development (Castells and Hall, 1994).
Figure 3.6: Factors affecting development of TST in the initial years (1 970s-1 989)
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iii StronE Government Presence and Short Development Time Frame
After 15 years of development, Taedok was deemed a cmailure" by some researchers.
However, it seemed too early to conclude that it failed since the science town was still in
its "infancy" stage. As the critical mass of research activities slowly developed a strong
science base with good quality skilled labor force, TST started to become a true science
city with increasing ability to attract research institutions and skilled labor and a high
incidence of high-tech spin-offs. The Korean government was proactive in improving its
policies and implementation plans to steer TST's development towards being an
advanced center of science in Korea.
b) Further development (after 1990)
i Stronq Science base, Pro-business environment and Entrepreneurial Culture
After 1990, a strong science base had been developed. The top research institutes and
universities in TST were the 'centers' of innovation. The innovations that came out of
these labs and universities could be commercialized quickly because of the pro-business
policy environment that the government advocated. The ease at which government labs
allowed spin-offs to be formed and the encouraging research environment, especially at
KAIST, gave researchers and students the freedom to set up start-ups and further their
research areas. The fact that the government could foresee the needs of TST e.g.
Incubator policy, industrial space, etc and opportunities of TST e.g. "Technobelt provided
a "competitive edge" for businesses in TST to grow and to optimize the economic
potential of TST.
For TST, it is observed that the public institutions are always at the forefront,
implementing the latest government policies. For example, despite reluctance to move to
Seoul, 11 public institutes proceeded to move to TST as compared to 3 private institutes.
In terms of being an innovative force and facilitating spin-offs, public institutions
(research and educational) were more instrumental than private research institutes in
coming up with new innovations and then facilitating the transformation of that innovation
into a new spin-off company and helping it to "grow". Most of the private firms only
moved in much later after TST showed some signs of success.
From this case, it can be seen that public institutions play a very important role in
planned technopole; first, in developing the required critical mass for a strong science
foundation for the new city, and second, in being the implementation arm for government
policies.
ii Availability of premises, infrastructure and industrial presence
The massive infrastructure development e.g. TSIC, TIC4, TCTC, etc provided the cheap
space needed for industries to locate near Taedok, which was not provided in the initial
plan. With increased industrial presence, TST could seek feedback from industries on its
research findings and the industries could upgrade their technology base with greater
access to new technology. The TVTV project not only facilitated the process of
technology transfer, it provided a secured and pro-business environment for companies
to grow until they are able to compete on its own in world market.
Figure 3.4: Factors affecting development of TST in the initial years (1 970s-1 989)
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3.4 Case Study 3: Tsukuba Science City (Japan)
3.4.1 Vision for Tsukuba Science City (TSC) and its planning
After World War II, Japan started the process of rebuilding its city and economy. One of
its primary objectives was to catch up in its level of science and technology with other
advanced countries. At the same time, Tokyo, in the 1950s, was experiencing over-
crowding due to rapid population expansion, making it unconducive for living and
working. Thus, in 1961, the Japanese government started to relocate government offices
en masse out of Tokyo.
In 1962, the Science and Technology Council made a report on the necessity of the
collective relocation of national experimental and research institutions and to consolidate
its presence. The government viewed building a science city as a means to increase the
domestic growth in science and technology in their nation, and was willing to invest
heavily to fund the development of these projects. In 1963, the Cabinet approved
Tsukuba district as the location for Japan's first Science City i.e. TSC.
TSC is located approximately 60 km northeast of the center of Tokyo and about 40 km
northwest of Narita International Airport. The site covers an area of approximately
28,400 ha at the southern part of Ibaraki Prefecture, with Mt. Tsukuba to the north and
Lake Kasumigaura on the east (see Appendix 4). The goal of TSC was to promote the
advancement of science and technology to sustain the urban growth of the capital region
and national economy.
The urban planning of the science city started in 1965 and a time frame of 10 years was
given for the basic construction and relocation works to be completed3 , ending 1975 (see
Appendix 5). TSC consists of two areas:
a) Research and Education District (RED), and
b) Surrounding Suburban District (SSD).
The RED covers about 2,700ha in the center of TSC, where national research and
educational institutes, residential area, and parks are located (Appendix 4). The RED
also includes an 80ha city center, which is the center of cultural, commercial and
administrative activities of TSC. Presently, about 13,000 employees are working in
national institutions, of which 8,500 of them are researchers (TSCI). The "Surrounding
Suburban District" is designed to accommodate private research facilities and future-
oriented industries while preserving agricultural land and the high-quality natural
environment (Castells and Hall, 1994). Many private research institutions have branched
out into the industrial parks and others in the Surrounding Suburban district. Their
research fields are mainly medicine, chemistry, electronics and electricity, mechanical
engineering, and construction. About 4,500 researchers are working at the private
institutions (TSCI).
In 1997, TSC had a population of about 188,000 and about 300 national and private
research institutions and corporations. The projected population of TSC in 2030 is
350,000.
3 An extension of deadline was granted for TSC to be completed in 1979 (Tsukuba Science City
Information).
Table 3.4: Present and Projected Population Growth in TSC
Present Planned Area
Population population
Tsukuba Science City 187,058 350,000 28,400ha
The Research and Education district 64,055 100,000 2,700ha
The Surrounding Suburban district 123,003 250,000 24,700ha
Source: TSCI
The 46 national research and educational institutes in Tsukuba currently report to a
great variety of government departments and agencies4. TSC has become Japan's
largest research and development center, representing approximately 27% of Japan's
national research facilities in one single location, and about 40% of the country's
research budget and employees.
3.4.2 Development of Tsukuba Science City
In the early days, Tsukuba's growth was slow and somewhat painful. Tsukuba, like
Taedok, was developed using "governmental force". Despite protests from local
residents and government workers, land acquisition proceeded in 1967 (with some
amendments to site boundaries to respond to local protests) and Tsukuba Science City
Construction Law was passed in 1970. There was also a lot of opposition to moving out
of Tokyo, both from the laboratories and from the Tokyo Teachers' College (Castells and
Hall, 1994). Nonetheless, the government proceeded to identify national research
institutes to move to TSC (11 institutes were identified in 1967, and increased to 43
national institutes by 1972, Appendix 5). By 1980, some 80% of the government
agencies with about 9,000 jobs (and 125,000 people) moved. The response of private
industry was slow. There were little take up by private industries in the three major
research parks planned for them in SSD.
In the 1980s, there were little interactions between public research and private sector
enterprises. Furthermore, the relocated research institutes tend to concentrate on large
projects focusing on target technologies and neglecting basic research and applied
research relevant to local industry or small and medium firms (Castells and Hall, 1994).
Between different disciplines of the research institutes, there was also little
communication. The vertical integration of Japanese government agencies prevented
research institutes from sharing facilities, which led to excessive duplication of
equipment.
TSC was a difficult place to obtain information and research support. Most of the
research institutes were institutionally rigid and could not enhance innovation or
entrepreneurship. Tsukuba was considered an "isolated island, remote from normal
human society" (Pg 72, Castells and Hall, 1994). It took 4 hours to travel to and fro
Tokyo. Thus, when the national institutions first moved to TSC, it was difficult to find
student help because it was perceived as being far from Tokyo, and there were too few
universities to provide research assistants.
4 10 to Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 1 to Ministry of Foreign Affair, 6 toMinistry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 1 to Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, 1 toEnvironmental Agency, 9 to Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 3 to Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare, and 13 to Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (TSCI).
Despite the negative feedback on TSC in the 1980s, it did bring about some positive
spillovers. Research institutes got new premises and new equipment for its operation.
The agglomeration of research institutes has promoted some small meetings among
researchers and facilitated the organization of conferences and symposiums in Tsukuba.
This gave rise to some exchange and cooperation.
Until the mid 1980s, TSC was failing to attract the private sector to the city. However, the
Tsukuba International Science and Technology Exposition 1985 changed this trend.
Private firms wanted to be near the Expo site and be within 1 hr's drive from Tokyo. TSC
became a good location for the private companies as the government had just
constructed a new expressway linking Tokyo and TSC for the Expo (Castells and Hall,
1994). Other infrastructure investment that Tsukuba profited from in terms of improved
accessibilities include the Joban Railway expansion to the neighboring city of Tsuchiuria,
which allows connection between Tsukuba to Tokyo in 1 hr 10 mins by train, and the
Joban Expressway, which extends to TSC, allowing direct access to central Tokyo by
car or express bus (Castells and Hall, 1994).
TSC is now into its third phase of development 5 in terms of infrastructure improvements,
which concentrates on the improvement of connections to Tokyo via high-speed train
(Joban New Line) and Metropolitan Inner City Expressway ("Ken-O Do"), and
development of new 2000 ha high quality settlements along the New Joban Line route
(Appendix 6). The New Joban Train Line, which will be open in 2005, will link TSC with
Akihabara in Tokyo in 45 minutes. The "Ken-o Do" is the ring highway around 40-60 km
of the Metropolitan area and it will connect Narita Airport and TSC in 25 minutes.
As of 1989, more than 200 private research facilities have been established in TSC,
many of which moved there after 1985. Industrial research parks, built by the
government in the SSD, provided suitable, cheap premises for private industries.
Currently, there are 7 such industrial/research parks and they house many laboratories
and factories of high-technology industries in close proximity to the RED of Tsukuba
(see Table 3.5). In addition to increasing the "hardware" of TSC, the government has
also improved the "software" in terms of better, shared on-line database throughout
Tsukuba Science City and other IT networks.
Table 3.5: Private Research Facilities in Tsukuba
industrial/Research Parks No. of companies Area (ha)
Tokodai Business and Research Park 28 39
Tsukuba Western Business and Research Park 14 102
Tsukuba Northern Business and Research Park 17 128
Tsukuba Research Park Hanare 7 5.4
Tsukuba Techno Park Toyosato 26 69
Tsukuba Techno Park Sakura 5 24.6
Tsukuba Techno Park Oho 10 41
Source: TSCI
s The first phase consists of city construction (1963 - 1980) where TSC saw the relocation of government
institutions into TSC. The second phase is the city development (1980s to late 1990s), which saw the
development of Tsukuba Center Building, international events such as Tsukuba Expo 1985, and the
relocation of private institutions into industrial areas located at the Surrounding Suburban Districts
(Tsukuba Science City Information, 1997).
To encourage industrial interaction with the public sector, a Research Exchange
Promotion Act was passed in Dec 1987. This Law, which allows private enterprises to
use the facilities of the national institutes and promotes personal exchange and joint
ownership of patents between national institutes and private enterprises, reinforced the
trend of increasing private sector presence in TSC. This Law resulted in numerous joint
research centers being set up at universities to promote industry-academic-government
tripartite cooperation, resulting in substantial increase in collaborations (see Table 3.6).
A framework of how universities cooperate with industries is in Appendix 7. The
government also encourages manpower movement between industry and academic so
that it will promote both the transfer of technology to industries and the communication of
industrial needs to the public research institutes.
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To what extent has Tsukuba been able to generate spin-offs? While TSC is seeing more
of joint research between private research companies and universities or public research
institutions, very few spin-offs resulted (Castells and Hall, 1994). For example, the
Electrotechnical Laboratory, one of the national research institutes in Tsukuba, has
developed many links with private companies and universities. They have more than 100
joint research projects with companies. But not many people from this laboratory transfer
to private companies, or universities, even after 20 years. Those who left went to the big
companies instead of starting their own business. "The USA-style "start-up" breakaways
are almost unknown here" (Castells and Hall, 1994).
In the 1990s, the Japanese government faced another challenge: the "hollowing-out" of
R&D activities. Investment in R&D by the Japanese government was smaller than that in
Western nations, and was unable to rise. Many fields of basic research were inferior to
those in Western countries, and application development researches were becoming
inferior to those in the United States. Japan's R&D systems were less flexible,
competitive and restricted. It was also a matter of great concern that young Japanese
were less interested in science and technology.
Thus, in 1996, the Science and Technology Basic Act was enacted to raise the level of
Japan's science and technology. In July 1996, a Science and Technology Basic Plan
was drawn up based on the provisions of the Act. The Plan aimed to develop Japan into
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a "country with international economic competitiveness and sustainable growth" by
"contributing to the world by generating knowledge and its utilization". Its strategy was to
develop new knowledge, produce knowledge-based vitality, and to create a society of
knowledge-based affluence.
The Plan adopted a two-prong approach to promote the advancement of science and
technology in Japan:
a) To promote systemic reforms for the construction of a new research and
development system by enhancing human capital, creating a flexible, competitive
and open research environment, the development of R&D abilities in industry,
universities and government, etc and
b) To increase investment in research and development. For a start, the
government intends to increase investment in government research and
development amount as a percentage of GDP beyond that of Europe and the
U.S.
A key feature of this plan is its emphasis that universities, national and public research
institutions in Japan must undertake more basic research to generate new knowledge.
Another feature is the strengthening of the linkage between acquiring new knowledge
and using new knowledge. Thus the process of technological transfer is very important
and this is achieved through improvement in the network of the industry-academia-
government cooperation and ensuring that there is consistent flow of knowledge from
the R&D to the society. Notably, TSC, which was the only city mentioned in the Science
and Technology Basic Plan, was tasked to be "a center for exchanges of information and
research throughout the world" (Science And Technology Basic Plan, 1996).
Some of the strategies outlined in the plan were as follows:
a) In order to strengthen its scientific base, Japan would focus on (a) improving its
human resources through improved education at universities, (b) creating an
appealing world-class research environment to enable young researchers to
pursue independent researches, (c) increasing the areas of industry-academic-
government cooperation and changing school education to cultivate interest in
the young toward science and technology. An appealing research environment
e.g. well-conditioned facilities, research supporters, intellectual infrastructure,
and research information infrastructure is crucial to attracting first-class local and
foreign researchers raising the level of research. Japanese researchers were
expected to produce research achievements of high quality and export them
worldwide.
b) To foster closer working ties between industries and academics, the government
allowed researchers and academics to work part-time at the research institute
and use the remaining time to carry out R&D with businesses or to provide
technical guidance for businesses. They also allowed academics to hold director
position in private companies that make use of the new technology derived from
the research findings. This established a system for human resource
interchange.
c) In terms of funding, the government is committed to continuously increase
research expense funds by increasing the pool of competitive funding i.e. funds
from which researchers could get from outside their research institutes.
Competitive funding had increased 2.4 times from 5% of total expenditure on
science and technology related expenditures in 1995 to 8.9% in 2000 (ARPST,
2001). These funding are allocated selectively on a competitive basis (APRST,
2001).
The objectives of increasing synergy, collaborations and technological transfer between
public and private sectors are being achieved as seen from the increase in the number
of joint research papers (Table 3.6). A survey6 in FY 1998 also showed that international
exchanges between researchers are also on the rise. The survey showed that there
were more foreign researchers in TSC in FY 98, an increase of 5% from previous year
and the average duration of stay is also longer (MEXT Press Release, 2000). The
purposes of the stay for majority of the people were research (1,728 people or 43% of
foreign researchers), training (1,110 people or 27%) and overseas study (1,014 people
or 25%).
The comprehensive strategies that the Japanese is implementing and their constant
policy review to "stock-take" their progress show their commitment to making science
and technological advancement successful in Japan.
3.4.3 Lessons from Tsukuba Science City
The development of TSC has been slow, but improving steadily. Much of its
improvement over the last 40 years has been motivated by government policies. An
attempt to draw lessons from TSC's development will be made over two periods:
a) Its initial years, from 1963 to 1985 (after major infrastructure improvements and
85 Tsukuba Expo was held) and
b) Developmental Years from 1985 to late 1990s. The Basic Plan approved in 1996
is a big push from the government to augment the situation in TSC then and will
be evaluated as part of the Developmental Years.
a) Initial Period (1963 - 1985)
i Inability to build a stronq science base and lack of facilities
After TSC was completed in the late 1970s, it had little ability to attract key research
institution and key research staff to build a science base strong enough to make it a key
R&D city. Similar to TST, it was only through government coercion that the critical mass
of the research institutions and universities relocated to TSC. Even after they moved
there in the 1980s, researchers and research institutes were unhappy because they had
to leave their family behind in Tokyo while they work in TSC (Castells and Hall, 1994).
Furthermore, the science city was far away from the main commercial cluster of Tokyo
and required long traveling time. Also, the researchers were unable to employ research
6 A total of 171 organizations in TSC was surveyed. This comprises 40 national research institutes and
universities, 6 public-service corporations, 2 incorporated educational institutions and 123 private
organizations. The number of organizations that responded was 102. Information was obtained from
those foreign researchers who had been staying for more than five days by means of a questionnaire.Chinese were the largest national contingent with 907 people (22%), followed by South Korea with 517(13%), the USA with 222 (6%), Thailand with 152 (4%), India with 140 (4%) and Indonesia with 138 (3%)(MEXT, 2000).
assistants as the main skilled population base was in Tokyo. There was also little
interdisciplinary research between research institutes or exchange of information in TSC.
ii Inability to attract Industries and lack of infrastructure
As the natural "technopole" was Tokyo, industries were unwilling to move to TSC despite
having access to purpose-built industrial and research parks. Similar to Taedok,
industries lag in moving to the new Science City until they have a good impetus to do so.
The unattractiveness of locating in TSC was reinforced by the poor transportation
infrastructure, which makes traveling between Tokyo and TSC extremely difficult. It was
thus impractical for businesses to relocate to TSC if it still wishes to be close to Tokyo.
iii Lack of Entrepreneurial Culture
Although there were no data on the number of spin-off firms created in the initial years of
TSC (if any), it was unlikely that there was substantial number of spin-offs created as
TSC was still trying to establish itself then. Even in the 1980s, TSC did not reap many
spin-offs as observed by Castells and Hall.
iv Government Policy
During these initial years, the government tried to build TSC into a credible science town
by improving the hardware and software of the new city. The government viewed TSC's
development as a long-term process. It was thus too early to decide if TSC had indeed
failed before 1985. However, the government was powerful and aggressive enough to
designate the relocation of some 43 research institutes and an entire university
(University of Tsukuba) into the new city. It thus showed the determination on the
government's part to ensure the success of TSC.
Figure 3.5: Factors affecting development of TSC in the Initial Years (1963 - 1985)
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b) Developmental Years (1985 to late 1990s)
i Massive Infrastructure Improvement and Increasing Industrial Presence
In subsequent years, the government invested heavily in transportation infrastructure
improvement to improve communication linkages with Tokyo, reducing traveling time
between Tokyo and TSC by half. The infrastructure improvement included extension of
rail service to nearby city of Tsuchiuria and a construction of expressway. The Expo 85
also created some "urgency" for firms to move into TSC to be near the expo site while
still being close to Tokyo. More private firms started relocating to TSC. The government
is now actively developing a new high-speed railway linking central Tokyo to the central
city of TSC. This railway also opens many opportunities along the route near TSC to
develop vacant land for approximately 100,000 new population that are expected to
relocate here by 2030. The new Metropolitan expressway ring will also link TSC with
other existing urban areas around the Metropolitan Tokyo and increase TSC's
accessibility as a science and technology hub.
Infrastructure improvements also include the development of the 7 private industrial
research parks by the government to provide well-equipped, convenient new premises
for the industries to relocate to. The government also made several IT improvements for
TSC to increase ease of communication and information sharing e.g. Tsukuba Network.
ii Stronq Science Base, Supporting Policy Environment and Greater Academia-
Industrial Synergy
During the 1980s, the city's profound psychological isolation from Tokyo was finally
beginning to break down. It could be due to the improved transportation connection or
the ever-expanding boundary of Tokyo metropolis beginning to approach close to
Tsukuba.
Other barriers those that separated the public institutes, the university and the private
companies were also breaking down. The science base of TSC was starting to mature
and networks formed between institutions. With the improved infrastructure and the
largest congregation of top universities and research centers of Japan in TSC,
researchers were more willing to relocate to TSC. These improvements were enhanced
when government reviewed its policies to reduce bureaucracy in the system affecting
science and technology and to encourage collaboration between industry and academia.
The private sector was at last beginning to invest in the city on some scale, resulting in a
marked increase in joint research between the public and private sector. It was thus
likely that the transfer of technology was successful. As TSC develops, it was able to
attract foreign researches to carry out training, research activities or even study in TSC.
As described in Castells and Hall, "one could begin to capture ...... the sense that the
grand design (of Tsukuba) was taking shape" (Castells and Hall, 1994).
The government's comprehensive approach in the Basic Plan 96 towards advancing
science and technology and its focus on enhancing the science base of TSC as its
priority for the next few years will have positive influence on TSC. Although it is still too
early to conclude the success of the Basic Plan, the important point is the government's
forward-looking and pro-active policy measures.
After 40 years of development, TSC is still transforming under the careful guidance of
the central Japanese government. TSC has been a very expensive State project, which
involves developing an entirely new city with state-of-the-art technological equipment
and facilities and good transport infrastructure. With the Basic Plan, more improvements
are likely to be seen.
Figure 3.6: Factors affecting development of TSC in the Developmental
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
4.1 Introduction
In their search of new sources of economic growth and social well-being, many cities
and regions made large infrastructure investment to develop technopoles, or science
cities. These planned technopoles generate high value-adding knowledge e.g. new
technology or innovation, which could be used by industries to gain product
competitiveness and/or reap first mover advantage.
The development patterns of "technopoles" are often "copies" of successful market-
driven US models of Route 128 or Silicon Valley. They project themselves as "innovation
centers' based on research and development. Locales that developed into successful
innovation centers had indeed become magnets for other high-tech firms to locate there,
forming a cluster of related companies and high-quality human capital.
This thesis studied the development history of Route 128 in detail to understand the
success factors of this high-tech cluster. A framework model (Figure 2.1) was developed
to show how the success factors interact with each other. When tested against other
planned technopoles, it was confirmed that the success factors in the framework were
similarly applicable and were key determinants of their ultimate success.
4.2 Boston's Route 128 as a successful case study
Although Route 128 has been a world icon for high-tech business, its economy was not
without booms and busts. For example, Boston suffered a bust in its mini-computer
industry when it could not compete against Silicon Valley's personal computer industry.
It suffered again when the US economy went into recession around 2000, but seemed to
be recovering in the last few months, with a resurgence of recession-resistant biotech
and bioinformatics firms around MIT. Unemployment in Route 128 had dropped, and
local venture capitalists e.g. Polaris and Highland Capital, were raising money again.
Nearly 440 software and Internet firms went bust last year, but 400 new ones were
created in their stead (The Economist, 9 Feb 02). MIT also retooled to bring business
and academia closer together. So what was it that allowed Route 128 to constantly re-
invent itself?
Three players were critical in the re-creation of Route 128: The Academia, Industry and
Government (see Framework). Although each player had been motivated by
fundamentally different goals, they all share interests in many fields of science and
engineering. All the players displayed the "entrepreneurial" spirit that propels each
individual to challenge its traditional boundary to explore and innovate. The area
provided a good living and working environment to retain and attract new talents to build
the human capital required for high-tech knowledge-based industries. This continuous
interaction between the three players created a special blend of culture, people,
institutions, and events that facilitated innovation and produce this hub of high
technology environment. The entire system became the "engine" that facilitated the
generation of the next wave of high-tech innovation and economic activities and formed
many new companies.
4.3 Lessons from testing the Framework
a) Set of success factors must be incorporated in the planning and implementation
of the Science City
The framework could be used to analyze the periods of relative success and failures in
the technopoles' development trajectories. It was found that as more of the factors
became present in the environments of the science cities, their relative success
increases.
For example, TST did not have an industrial presence in its initial years, as it was a
deliberate government policy to preserve its status as a high-quality environment purely
for scientific research. Thus, the universities and research institutes were unable to
foster interactions with industries to obtain feedback on their findings. TST was neither
able to provide scientific benefits to neighboring cities nor become a true leading science
and technology center of South Korea. By sheer will of a government, the coerced mass
relocation of government institutions into TST built up a critical mass of scientific
activities in the new city. After 1990, this "forced" cluster created new opportunities and
made it natural consequence for private research institutes to relocate there. Local
government reinforced private industrial presence by building industrial estates next to
TSC.
It must be cautioned that the critical mass build-up may not be the only reason for
industries to move to TSC. Concurrent to the scientific build-up, the government had
also improved public infrastructures e.g. schools, etc, to provide a good quality
environment for living. Government policies are also reviewed and improved to make it
easier for start-ups and collaborations between public and private organizations. Thus,
all the success factors have to be taken into account to make TST attractive and these
factors should be taken into account from the outset when planning the science city.
b) Local condition will determine relative emphasis of different factors
Although the framework could be used to understand the critical ingredients that
influence a science city project, factors could have different "emphasis" in different
science cities. For example, TST and TSC placed lesser emphasis on network formation
amongst businesses than to encourage collaborations between public research institutes
and private enterprises. However, a less prevalent network of businesses does not
mean that these science cities were not successful. It could alternatively be interpreted
that "if TSC and TST could also subsequently develop a supporting pool of business
networks within these science cities, it would probably enhance the cities' position both
as a strong science research cluster and a commerce cluster'.
Although the factors could have different emphasis in different science cities, several
factors seemed to be strong anchors that consistently played very important roles in
each of the science cities. These factors are: Stronq Science Base, Skilled Workforce,Supportive Policy Environment, Availability of Funding, and Need for synergy between
Academia, Government and Industry. These factors seem to form the basis for which
other factors build on to enhance the attractiveness of the science city.
c) Success of Science City depends on how well it achieves its objectives and is
measured by many factors e.g. number of spin-offs, extent of technology
transfer, new innovations, job creation, etc
Number of spin-off companies is often a positive indicator for economic growth as they
contribute to the business base, create jobs and add to economic diversity. Facilitating
spin-off formation from a new discovery or innovation is thus often pursued as a
government policy. However, if a science city does not create many spin-off companies,
it does not mean that the Science City is unsuccessful. For example, in TSC, spin-offs
formation was not a prominent policy goal as compared to TST and this outcome could
be due to cultural or political peculiarities of each country.
The success of a science city should be studied not only in terms of job creation and
level of innovation; it should also take into account whether the science city had
achieved the specific objectives assigned to it. The objective of TSC was to facilitate
public-private collaboration extensively with the goal of elevating the technological
capabilities of industries. The extensive collaborations between public research and
educational institutions with existing industries have indeed fulfilled this objective and
TSC can thus be considered somewhat a success in this respect.
d) It is more critical that all factors be developed than which party is responsible.
The framework must not be interpreted in its strictest sense. The factors "under" each
respective player are derived based on Route 128 case study. Notwithstanding this, it
must be highlighted that it is less important "which" is the party "supplying" the respective
factor. The critical point is that someone is providing it, thus enabling the factor to
contribute to improving the environment so that the potential of the science city could be
maximized. Therefore, different players could provide the same factor for different case
studies.
For example, the government traditionally provides research funding for high-risk, long-
term research activities that may not have immediate commercial value. Thus, private
companies do not find it profitable to undertake such research. However, if a big
corporation engages in joint research with the university in basic research, the sources
of funding would not only be available from government grants, but also industry. If the
financial structure changes to allow research institutes to have better autonomy over
their finances, research institutes could generate additional income as a source of
research funding. Similarly, a strong science base doesn't have to be formed purely by
public institutions. In Japan, big corporations have known to invest heavily in corporate
research and could similarly add to the development of a strong science base if several
large companies concentrate their research branch in the same locale.
4.4 Other Lessons from Case Studies
a) Role of Government changes over time depending on the development stage of
the science city
The role of Government featured strongly in all three case studies, especially in their
initial years. The governments were able to "force" government institutions into the new
science city regardless whether the science city or research institutes were ready to do
so. For example, the infrastructure provisions for all three cities were not fully developed
when the institutes were relocated. Especially for TST, which is located 160km from
Seoul in the countryside, the employees were particularly unwilling to move there
because their families had to remain in Seoul due to the lack of community facilities in
TST. Similarly, TSC was also still considered "far" by the researchers due to long
traveling time. The fact that the governments were powerful enough to effect the
institutes' move into the science city made the feat of building a critical mass of scientific
activities in the science city more manageable.
As the science city develops, the role of the government changes. A powerful State can
become both a positive or negative force in the subsequent years of the city. The
changes in the role of the government are manifested in how the government interacts
with Academia and Industry through its policies at different stages of development,
taking into account the culture prevailing in that country. Changes in government policies
can and will directly affect the potential achievements of the Science City.
For example, the environment for innovation and entrepreneurial activities may be
undermined if the government imposes unconstructive policies like in the case of
Akademgorodok. Under Brezhnev, the potential of Akademgorodok was undermined as
the government became more interested in the bureaucratic procedures and imposing
extreme controls on research activities. This stifled the scientists' enthusiasm in their
work and their ability to pursue their research. On the other hand, the governments in
Korea and Japan were more developmental in their policies. The Korean government
continued to improve the quality of schools, infrastructure, etc to make the new city more
accessible and relaxed guidelines for research to make research environment more
attractive to high-quality talents. The Japanese government studied the "ground
sentiments" by carrying out regular surveys and reviews of strategic policy directions to
ensure that TSC remains relevant in the changing environment. Such proactive action
on the part of the government is commendable as it imposes a self-checking element
into the science city development.
Overall, building a science city requires a strong political will on the part of the
government to constantly "innovate" to attract industries, public organizations and talents
from around the world. Its role has to eventually evolve from being a regulator to a
facilitator once the science city gains some dynamism.
b) Developing a science city needs a long time
Any critical evaluation of the achievement of Science City can only be made over a long
period of time. Governments are in danger of pre-judging whether a science city is
successful or not after the science city is in "operation" for a few years. This could be
due to high level of public accountability for the substantial public investment in the
construction and infrastructure works, or simply pressures to present "results" during
election times. However, time is needed for a science city to develop an identity, culture,
social and business networks while the communication networks and human capital of
the science city is being improved.
In all three case studies, assessments were carried out between the periods of its
inception in the 1950s and 60s till the late 1990s. During these periods, all the science
cities saw varying degrees of vitality and depression in its ability to be the leading
science and technology center for the region. Akademgorodok was successful initially,
before going down in the Brezhnev regime and finally, revived again after perestroika.
Taedok and Tsukuba had little ability to be a milieu of innovation initially, but slowly
gained strength in its later years. Castells and Hall noted that the Japanese applies an
extraordinarily low discount rate to large public projects, which means that they were not
expected to show an effective return for 20 or even 30 years. This showed that they
understood that it requires a long time for a science city develop, and any judgment on
the science city after only a decade of development would be a "profound mistake" (Pg
76, Castells and Hall, 1994).
c) Flexibility to deal with change i.e. political, technological and economical
The Akademgorodok case study illustrated that even if a science city was successful for
a period of time, it did not guarantee success forever. The change in its dynamism and
attractiveness could be due to a change in the internal and/or external environments
affecting the science city e.g. a shift in technology, as experienced in Route 128 after
minicomputers fell out of favor to personal computers. In view of the numerous factors
and changes that could affect the science cities, it would not be possible for the
government to constantly anticipate and be the "invisible" hand to manage prospective
change all the time.
Since no regional economy has the birthright to lead the next wave of innovation, it is
thus more important to ensure that the foundation of factors for a successful science city
are built and entrenched into the system. This will ensure that the region can have the
ability to re-industrialize and build its next boom after it experiences a setback.
Ultimately, the real success of a science city or a high-tech cluster is its ability to
withstand the test of time with constant innovation, even during different technological
eras.
d) Importance of communication i.e. information flow and synergy
Synergy is often seen in terms of networks connecting individuals in many different
organizations within a system. These networks encourage information flow and through
this, generate new ideas. Such a place enjoys the peak of innovative milieu. As
described by Castells and Hall, "synergy operates effectively to generate constant
innovation on the basis of a social organization specific to the production complex
located in that place" (Pg 225, Castells and Hall, 1994).
In the globalized capital markets where investment is mobile, location decisions of firms
are often based on where they can reap the most economic benefits. Thus, science
cities, together with its surrounding regions, should try to achieve such synergistic
relationship so that it can transfer new knowledge to industries, which would allow
industries to gain a competitive advantage in the global economy. As seen from Route
128's experience, the agglomeration of high-tech firms in the Route 128 region was
primarily due to easy access to exchanges with other high-tech firms clustering in this
area. Ultimately, it would be the access to information, state-of-the-art technology and
innovative ideas that would make a location choice comparatively more attractive than
other location options around the world. Thus, the system must foster synergistic
activities and interaction between academia, government and industry to facilitate
knowledge exchange. If not, there would be no reason why company and talents would
want to remain in a concentrated area.
4.5 Policy Implications for Singapore
Like Korea and Japan, the Singapore government has been orchestrating her economic
development since independence in 1965. In the early years, the government
encouraged foreign investment as one of the pillars for economic growth. It was easier to
attract foreign investment then because there wwere less competition from other
countries. However, with the emergence of China and India, that could provide both
cheap labor and a large domestic market, foreign investment has moved into these
countries.
Countries around the world have also been enhancing their technological capabilities to
produce higher value goods. For example, in terms of goods production, China now has
a flying geese formation: cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen are in the lead producing
higher value added goods, supported by hinterlands such as Shandong and Guangxi;
while further down cities in the western region such as Chengdu and Xi'an produce more
labour-intensive products. In India, the consensus was to gradually emerge from the old
model of the licence raj and to plug itself into the international grid, in order to prosper
with the rest of the world. Specific sectors had taken off dramatically, especially IT,
showing India's potential if the whole economy could get moving (Speech by Singapore's
Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 19 Sep 2001).
In this competitive global economic landscape, the need for Singapore to reposition itself
to capture the opportunities of globalization is even greater because of its inherently
small domestic market. Singapore needs to re-think its economic development
philosophy, find new, additional basis for economic growth and job creation. As
commented by Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Dr Tony Tan in the 6th meeting of theInternational Advisory Council (IAC) on new economic strategies for Singapore, "the new
economy engenders a spirit of creativity, innovation and speed, and new rules are
needed to embrace this spirit." The IAC advised if Singapore wants to become a global
hub for knowledge-driven business and investment, she needs to build on her existing
strengths to develop new pillars of competitive advantage that will stimulate innovation
and enterprise formation.
4.5.1 Increasing importance in the role of the government
In recent years, many people have criticized that the Singapore government intervened
too much in trying to "steer the economy" and that the market should play a bigger role
in determining which sector should be developed. The government led Singapore out of
the textile industry and into consumer electronics and semiconductors, and is now
betting $2 billion on the life sciences. However, the reality is that only the Government
has the might to move Singapore quickly into a potential high-growth sector in the
current environment where knowledge asset is often proprietary and difficult for private
enterprise to access. Thus, for an industry like the life sciences to take off, enormous
expenditure is needed to build research centers, assemble world-class scientists, and
support long-term research.
Fortunately, Singapore doesn't have to start afresh. The government's successful
developmental policy in the last 40 years had enabled Singapore to develop its strength
in having a world-class infrastructure, pro-business environment and skilled manpower.
In the more recent decade, the government had also been introducing strategies to
transform Singapore into a knowledge-based economy. The strategies employed are
multi-faceted, ranging from tangible improvements, such as providing investment
incentives to favored industries, developing purpose-built science parks for R&D
activities, improving its communication infrastructure (transportation and
telecommunication), providing source of funds for research and local businesses, to the
intangible improvements such as improving the quality of education and urban
environment of Singapore as a city to live and work in. Like other cities around the world,
Singapore is also developing a miniature "science city" i.e. One North Science Hub next
to the National University of Singapore to concentrate research institutions (private and
public).
An example of a policy developed on the basis of the "new economy" is
Technopreneurship 21. To enable technopreneurship to flourish in Singapore, the
Government launched four initiatives centering on education, facilities, regulations and
financing. The objective is to build a critical mass of technopreneurial talent, including
researchers, innovators, investment bankers, analysts, marketers, venture capitalists,
and patent and corporate lawyers. A US$1 -billion Technopreneurship Investment Fund
was also set up to jump-start the venture-capital industry.
Taking the entire Singapore as a technopole and using Figure 2.1 as a basis of analysis,
it seemed that government's past strategies had generally served Singapore well,
especially in terms of providing a foundation of developmental policies and strong
industrial base. R&D activities, in particular, had been increasingly steadily over the
years, from approximately S$756.8mil (US$416mil') in 1991 to S$3009.5mil
(US$1672mil) in 2000 (see Figure 1 in Appendix 8). In terms of providing research
funding, the government is the 2nd largest source of R&D funding, providing 39% of total
R&D funds for 2000. The largest source of fund is internal sources i.e. from the company
themselves, etc, which amounts to 54% of total R&D funds in 2000 (NSTB, 2000).
However, despite investing heavily in R&D, Singapore still has a relatively weak science
base as compared to other countries. At the same time, Singapore does not have a
Using an exchange rate of S$1.8 to US$1 for conversion.
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strong entrepreneurial culture amongst its people, as compared to other advanced
countries, thus making the process of commercializing innovative ideas more difficult
(see Chapter 5).
4.5.2 To build a Strong Science Base and skilled workforce
Singapore distinguishes itself from other emerging economies because private sector
accounts for a high share of its R&D. In 2000, its share of foreign firm investment in
general expenditures in R&D is estimated to be 62%, or approximately US$1.03b
(NSTB, 2000). A study done by Asian Development Bank Institute showed that the R&D
carried out in Singapore by private research institutes was more "development" rather
than "research" (Amsden, Goto and Tschang, 2000). They found that R&D in Singapore
was more an adaptation of an existing product or concept and not cutting edge research.
For foreign firms, any new research undertaken by the company is always done in their
corporate headquarters. The study also found that whatever innovative R&D that does
take place in Singapore results from government pressure on MNCs. The study thus
shows that little pure science or basic research will be undertaken in emerging
economies by MNCs, unless nationally owned enterprises have already taken the lead in
investing such activities. Evidence from the survey of private R&D activities reaffirm the
study's findings. In fact, no only does the private R&D engage in little basic research,
even the government labs and public institutions engage in extremely little basic
research activities (see Figure 2 in Appendix 8).
The study explains that the reason why companies did not undertake high-end R&D in
Singapore was because of the size of effort required and the qualifications of
researchers. The size of research effort in Singapore was smaller primarily because of
the limited supply of highly qualified researchers. Thus, technological rents generated by
R&D in Singapore could not be expected to equal those generated by R&D in corporate
headquarters. Nonetheless, the author opined that Singapore remained distinct because
there is a trend for MNCs to carry out more advanced types of R&D in Singapore due to
the pervasive use of English and government incentives (Amsden, Goto and Tschang,
2000).
4.5.3 Policy Recommendations
In order to build Singapore into a true science city, it must first strengthen its science
base. By virtue of Singapore's small size, developing a 'science city' per se seems
secondary since the entire island can be considered a high-tech cluster itself.
Furthermore, its good public communication infrastructure (telecommunication and
transportation) makes every part of the island easily accessible. In terms of overall R&D
expenditure, Singapore still lags behind other countries in terms of Gross Expenditure on
Research and Development (GERD) as a percentage of GDP (see Figure 3 in Appendix
8).
In order to strengthen its science base, I recommend that the government improve the
quality of its universities and research institutes. It is through the universities and
research institutes that new knowledge is generated for the economy. Based on the
Asiaweek Magazine's report on Asia's Best Universities in 2000, National University of
Singapore was ranked 6th in the category of "Multi-Disciplinary Schools" 2 and Nanyang
Technological University was ranked 8th amongst the Asia's Science and Technology
school. Japanese and Korean universities hold the top two positions of both categories
(see Table 4.1).
Table 41: Asia's Best Universities 2000
Rank Multi-Disciplinary Schools Science and Technology
1 Kyoto University (Japan) Korea Advanced Inst. of Science & Tech(South Korea)
2 Tohoku University (Japan) Pohang University of Science & Tech.(South Korea)
3 University of Hong Kong Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
4 Seoul National University Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi
5 National University of Singapore Indian Institute of Technology, Madras
6 Chinese University of Hong Kong Tokyo Institute of Technology
7 Hong Kong University of Science and Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur
Technology
8 Australian National University Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur
9 University of Melbourne Nanyang Technological University
(Singapore)
10 University of New South Wales Taiwan University of Science & Tech
Source: Asiaweek.com
There must be good quality, innovative manpower behind the research projects. Thus,
the government and education system must encourage more top students to take up
PhD programs to make research a career option. Singapore's DPM Dr Tony Tan also
expressed this need: "we still need to educate and train more scientists and researchers
so that they can take the economy up to a higher level" (Straits Times Interactive, 10
Feb 02). Singapore must also attract top foreign researchers to work here to increase
the number of high-quality manpower quickly. To be able to attract and retain innovation
talent (local and foreign), Singapore needs to enhance the quality of life and to create an
attractive work environment. The government research labs and tertiary institutions must
carry out more basic research to "fill the research gap" that currently exists.
Concurrently, Singapore government could continue to provide the conditions that can
entice private corporate R&D labs to engage in higher value research. However, as seen
from the previous case studies, private investment will only increase their investment in
a new place when they are assured that the environment is good. Thus, it is only when
Singapore's national research institutions and research environment become world-class
themselves, will it present a sustainable incentive for the private corporations to carry out
higher-level cutting edge R&D in Singapore. When that is achieved, Singapore can then
truly be considered a science city with a self-sustaining level of creative energy.
2 Multi-disciplinary universities offer a broad spectrum of courses from arts to business to engineering.
Science and technology schools have a more specialized focus.
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4.6 Limitations of study
The research for the thesis was done using case study methodology. Lessons drawn for
technopole development were based on the cases chosen for research. It would be ideal
if the success factors could be tested through several more case studies.
Due to time limitation, I was unable to do surveys with industrialists to have first-hand
information to reaffirm the success factors identified. Also, legal issues with regards to
the sufficiency of patents and intellectual property protection were not explored in this
thesis.
4.7 Future Research
A possible area for future research is to apply the success factors to Singapore and
study in greater details how its policies could be improved to facilitate the advancement
of Singapore's science and technology.
CHAPTER 5: ENTREPRENEURIAL CULTURE IN SINGAPORE
5.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship has been described by the Center for Entrepreneurship at Babson
College in Massachusetts as a way of thinking and acting that is opportunity obsessed,
holistic approach and leadership. To have a culture of entrepreneurship in the society
means that people must think differently, striving to be less conformist and more
creative, able and willing to see and take advantage of an opportunity to improve things.
Many people have criticized that Singapore lacks an entrepreneurial culture. One such
report is the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2001 Executive Report', which
systematically examined cross-national comparisons of the level of entrepreneurship.
The GEM 2001 report indicated that Singapore had the third lowest rates of
entrepreneurial activity among the GEM 2001 countries2 (5.2 Persons per 100 Adults
between 18 and 64 yrs old), only slightly above Belgium (about 4.5 persons) Japan
(about 5.1 persons).3
Singapore's entrepreneurial culture is also often compared to that of Hong Kong's. With
the communist liberation of the Mainland, Hong Kong received an influx of ready-made
entrepreneurs, manufacturers, bankers, shipping operators and traders from the coastal
cities such as Shanghai, Xiamen, Shantou and Guangzhou. They built the
manufacturing industry in Hong Kong, starting with textiles, plastics, toys and business
like shipping and banking. They were experienced entrepreneurs and spawned an
entrepreneurial culture among other displaced people who flooded into Hong Kong. The
bulk of immigrants that came to Singapore, however, were workers looking for wage
employment. Those who did turn to business were mostly traders and shopkeepers with
no experience in investing in factories that required long gestation periods and large
capital expenditure before they could break even and eventually become profitable.
Singapore banks were not keen to advance money to traders to start factories as the
bankers did not have the experience or the expertise to make such risk assessments
and to manage the risks. Although some Chinese immigrants did build enterprises that
became large local enterprises today e.g. the banks, trading companies, family retail and
1 Leading scholars of Babson College and London Business School initiated GEM program in 1997, with
strong support from Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership at the Ewing Marion Kauffman
foundation in Kansas City, Missouri. IBM became a global sponsor for GEN 2001.
2 The countries in the GEM report includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlandsm Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and U.K from the
European Region; India, Japan, Korea and Singapore from the Asian Region; Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico from the Latin American Region; Canada and USA from the North American Regions; and
Australia, Israel, New Zealand and South Africa. Data were assembled for each participating country from
four basic sources: 1) surveys of at least 2000 adults in each country; 2) in-depth interviews with more
than 950 national experts on entrepreneurship; 3) standardized questionnaires completed by the national
experts; and 4) a wide selection of standardized national data.
3 The report also noted that the small size of Singapore's domestic market and the general weakness in
the economies of the region has made it more difficult for start-ups to grow without exporting. Those
seeking funding therefore have to demonstrate an ability to penetrate global markets.
real estate empires, Singapore, in general, is belief not to have "inherited" a strong
entrepreneurial tradition.
However, if entrepreneurship is about a way of thinking, opportunity seizing for
improvement and leadership in implementation, then, entrepreneurship is not only about
new venture creation by private individuals. Entrepreneurs could be either public or
private entrepreneurs i.e. entrepreneurs in state-owned enterprises and privately owned
enterprises. If this were so, Singapore should have more entrepreneurs than perceived
due to the strong presence of successful state-owned enterprises.
5.2 Paradox of Income Distribution
The rise of state owned enterprises in Singapore could be explained using the theory of
the Paradox of Income Distribution (Amsden, 2001). The theory states that:
a) The more equal the income distribution, the more the government will
concentrate its resources through the use of industrial policies to build up
"national firms" and establish their core competencies inside or outside
manufacturing.
b) The greater the inequality, the more diffusionist the policies and hence, the
greater the difficulty of creating national leaders with proprietary, cutting-edge
skills.
Why is this so? The reasons are as follows:
a) An unequal distribution of natural resources (thus affecting income distribution)
tends to create Ricardian quasi-rents. Thus, if the flow of resources from
agriculture to manufacturing depend on relative rates of return, these rents make
it more difficult for manufacturing to compete for resources, especially in the
absence of knowledge-based assets that create offsetting entrepreneurial
manufacturing rents. With quasi-rents, intermediate assets have to be higher
than otherwise to make manufacturing relatively profitable and to entice the rich
entrepreneurs to invest in manufacturing.
b) Government may allocate intermediate assets to either a relatively large number
of firms (diffusion) or to a relatively small number of "national leaders"
(concentration). The association between income inequality and diffusionist
policies is paradoxical because, if governments (especially authoritarian
governments) are regarded as a handmaiden of the rich and powerful, then a
concentration of subsidies is expected when existing income distribution is highly
skewed. However, if the government skews subsidies to favor existing rich
people (because they are experienced businessmen with project execution
skills), it will further increase the income inequality gap, making it politically
undesirable. Thus, it is the countries with equal income distributions that tend to
have developed highly capable national firm leaders and build core
competencies.
Using a sample of late industrialized countries as case studies, Amsden showed that
that countries with the most equal land distributions i.e. Korea Taiwan and Thailand (Gini
coefficients below 0.5) invested heavily in national firms to build national skills whereas
countries with the most unequal land distributions i.e. Argentina, Brazil, and Malaysia
(Gini coefficients of 0.7 or above) relied on broad diffusionist approach and could not
develop core competency in knowledge-based assets.
5.3 Rise of State-owned Enterprises in Singapore
After gaining independence in 1965, the government invested heavily in physical
infrastructure e.g. port, airport, roads, utilities, industrial estates, health and education.
The government concurrently embarked on an industrial strategy of labor-intensive
export manufacturing led by multinationals, especially in the electronics industry (Texas
Instruments, Fairchild, etc.) for mass employment creation and global market access.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Singapore experienced a relatively equal income
distribution (Gini coefficient of less than 0.5 - see Chart 5.1), largely because of the new
home ownership scheme. As a new nation little natural resources and a small primary
production sector, the government geared its investment towards industrialization in
target industries e.g. petrochemical, cement plant, construction, shipbuilding, etc.
Without a pool of promising local enterprises that the government could "groom" into big
local business groups (unlike Korea), the government set up state owned enterprises in
these key industries and started to build core competencies in these industries.
Chart 5.1: Income Disparity in Singapore (1973 - 1989)
E Gini
Coeffcients
(Singapore)
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Source: Deininger and Squire Data Set, The World Bank Group
Because Singapore lacked the capital or interest, government ministers undertook the
task of starting new ventures (The Straits Times Interactive, 9 Feb 2002). The
government invested heavily in state-owned enterprises in key sectors. Successful
finance ministers undertook the task of starting new enterprises. For example, the late
Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee started a shipping line with government officers and a
Pakistani shipping expert to guide them. Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) eventually
succeeded. When Malaysia-Singapore Airlines was broken up, the government started
Singapore Airlines (SIA) headed by some outstanding civil servants. The same story
applied to other enterprises such as National Iron & Steel, Chartered Industries, Keppel
Group, Sembawang and Jurong shipyards, and several enterprises in food processing.
To undertake the risks of lending to new manufacturing ventures, the government
1988 1989
started the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS). These businesses grew into
conglomerates e.g. SIA, SingTel, SingTech, Keppel and became Government-Linked
Companies (GLCs) when partially privatized through the stock market.
How did the government attract so many public entrepreneurs into the public sector? To
build a good-quality government, prestigious full government scholarships were offered
to about 250 top young students each year with good academic results to pursue tertiary
education in world-class universities in the US and UK. The government scholarships
are awarded on a meritocracy basis. These young students, known as "scholars", will
serve in the government upon graduation and are almost guaranteed good paying, high-
ranking public sector jobs or GLCs. Since the 1970s, the expansion of the civil service
and state owned sector was complemented by this steady supply of top-notch human
capital in the country. These "scholars", who returned to work as salaried managers and
technocrats, benefited from expansion of the civil service and state-owned sector. Thus,
under this system, the smartest are "pulled" into the government service and act like
"public entrepreneurs" in their posts.
The state of GLCs now
There are now approximately 50 GLCs in Singapore in various industrial sectors (see
Appendix 9). GLCs play an important in the Singapore economy. Many of the GLCs are
successful companies today and ranked amongst the top companies in the world in their
industry sector. Their estimated contribution to GDP in 1998 was 12.9 per cent, which
was more than a quarter of local-controlled companies' estimated contribution to GDP.
The presence of these GLCs is over-whelming. For the average Singaporean, the
government or some government-linked (owned) entity is her landlord/ property
developer, banker, savings/mutual fund manager (i.e. Central Provident Fund 4), utilities
provider (telecoms, electricity, water), public transport provider (transit, bus, taxi), media
provider (newspaper, radio, TV), educator (kindergarten through university), recreation
provider, and may well be her employer, insurer and provider of other services--not
through taxes, but through fees charged by profit-making (often monopolistic)
government or government-linked entities, in which she herself is likely to own stock.
Local business is disproportionately reliant on government and multinationals as
customers (Linda Lim, 2002). Thus, Singapore experienced a situation where the GLCs
are "crowding out" the local businesses, as they are so competitive and could enjoy
economies of scale.
However, to stay ahead of global competition, Singapore cannot rely only on MNCs and
GLCs. Entrepreneurship in the private sector is an important factor in introducing
economic dynamism into Singapore. To bring Singapore to the next phase of
development, the government policies need to encourage the formation and growth of
enterprises. Only then, can Singapore into a vibrant business hub for companies big or
small.
4 Singapore's version of superannuation fund where a total amounting to 40% of monthly salary will be
deposited into the CPF funds. These CPF is used only for selected investment or purchase.
5.4 Singapore's Local Private Enterprises - Private Sector Entrepreneurship
As shown in the GEM study, the current state of private entrepreneurship is indeed lower
than most countries. Although part of the reasons could be that the best human capital
are already absorbed into the public sector, thus reducing the pool of "potential private
entrepreneurs" the fact remained that the entrepreneurship is not a prevalent cultural
trait in Singapore. This sentiment is often echoed by observers locally and abroad.
- "Singapore's habits are found to stall innovation" IHT 3/24-25/015
- "The survey found that among the things hindering Singapore were "fear of
failure and an associated preference for stable, corporate employment".
Analysts say Singapore's paternalistic government, its conformist political culture
and an education system that puts too little emphasis on independent thought
and creativity had combined to stifle innovation. "The hard truth is that Singapore
has cultivated a generation of followers rather than a generation of innovators.....
That's fine for massive, concerted, centrally-directed growth. But at a time of
rapid change and the need for multiple and continuous innovation across an
entire economy, the supply of entrepreneurs is suddenly, painfully short." Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor Study
- 'We Singaporeans are too careful, too rule-based, and when we have no rules,
we are paralysed." Sim Wong Hoo, chairman of Creative Technology and head
of private sector committee that promotes technology-based entrepreneurship.
- "In Singapore many of those who were most likely to succeed have been
inducted into politics, the bureaucracy and the army, navy and air force. Hence
too few are in business on their own and even fewer are entrepreneurs." Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Feb. 5, 2002, speech.
5.5 Government efforts in entrepreneurship development
A vibrant entrepreneurial culture in a society cannot develop overnight. It has to be a
national effort to nurture a pro-enterprise environment. The Government, through its
various agencies, has been undertaking the role of a nurturer and facilitator. They are
inculcating creative thinking skills in students, providing program to empower existing
entrepreneurs with business skills, and recognizing the successful efforts of homegrown
entrepreneurs, among others. Some of the efforts in creating a pro-entrepreneurship
environment include the following (Mr Tang Guan Seng, 24/3/2001, speech):
5.5.1 Education
Revamping the educational system by Ministry of Education and introduce courses on
entrepreneurship in institutes of higher learning. For example, the School of Computing
in National University of Singapore now conducts a minor in entrepreneurship for
Engineering students. The Entrepreneurship Development Center at NTU conducts a 2-
week course called the Enterprise Development Growth and Expansion (EDGE)
5 Quote extracted from Prof Linda Lim's speech.
program for the CEOs and managers of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).
Polytechnics have also introduced entrepreneurship modules and established centers
such as the Technopreneurship and Design Center at Nanyang Polytechnic.
5.5.2 Schemes to assist SMEs
There are now over 60 program offered by statutory boards that provide various forms of
assistance to SMEs. For instance, SMEs can make use of the Local Enterprise
Technical Assistance Scheme (or LETAS) for human resource development. It defrays
up to 50% of the fees paid to consultants who help "professionalize" the human
resources management of SMEs. There is also the e-GEN (e-Growing Enterprise Net-
enabling) Education jointly offered by PSB and HP, which provide training to SMEs in e-
commerce, critical skills in today's knowledge-based economy.
5.5.3 Recognition of homegrown entrepreneurs
For Singapore to become a place where enterprises and innovation thrive, these
efforts can only help complete half the journey. The Government can only play a
supporting role, and assist where necessary. The people are the ones who would
have to complete the other half of the journey, to take advantage of new
opportunities, upgrade their skills, and find their niche in the global market.
To encourage more entrepreneurs, the government uses a "role model"
approach by giving due recognition to those who are pro-active, who have
succeeded despite failures along the way. The various awards given to local
entrepreneurs are Phoenix Award, the Enterprise 50 Awards, and the inaugural
Netrepreneur of the Year Award.
5.5.4 On-going Efforts
On 3 Dec 2001, the government set up a 7-team Economic Review Committee to
fundamentally review Singapore's development strategy and formulate a blueprint to
restructure the economy. The Committee is to work out new strategies to develop
upgrade, transform and revitalize the Singapore economy for development as a regional
hub in Asia to sustain economic growth, create new jobs and increase the wealth of
Singaporeans. One sub-committee was designated to study the promotion of
entrepreneurship, and the growth and internationalization of Singapore-based
companies. The entrepreneurship sub-committee felt more talent needed to be
channeled into building businesses. As a preliminary proposal, the committee proposed
that 10 per cent of scholarship holders should be allowed to opt, or be selected, to
pursue private sector opportunities. They could either be told to defer their bonds or
leave upon their completion (The Straits Times Interactive, 8 Apr 2002).
5.6 Conclusion
While it seemed that Singapore did not inherit the entrepreneurial culture from her early
immigrants, she is not entirely lack of entrepreneurs. Singapore's entrepreneurs are
mainly "public entrepreneurs", implementing change and innovating in the civil service
and GLCs.
To develop a dynamic economy, it is no longer sufficient to rely on MNCs and GLCs.
The government policy now is to "breed" entrepreneurs. More people must be nurtured
to be more independent and self-reliant. They must be prepared to accept failure in
entrepreneurial and innovation effort. The environment and policies must facilitate easy
firm formation and to allow small business to thrive among the enterprises in the global
economy.
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APPENDIX I
Location of Akaden
- J d D Non
Source: http://design.Ibl.gov/-telnov/htmls/akadem.html
Akademgorodok Science Ci
Source: http://www-sbras.nsc.ru/sicc/sbrashtm, http://design.IbL.gov/~teInov/htmls/akadem.html
Examples of Research Areas in Akademgorodok
Sino Research Areas Research Institutes in Akademgorodok
1 Mathematical And 1. Sobolev Institute of Mathematics,
Computer 2. Institute of Computational Mathematics
Sciences 3. Mathematical Geophysics (Computing Centre)
4. United Institute of Computer Science (comprises the Institute of
Computational Technologies, Ershov Institute of Informatics
Systems and Design and Technology Institute of Data
Processing Equipment)
2 Physical Sciences 1. Budker Institute of Nuclear Physics
2. Institute of Laser Physics
3. United Institute of Semiconductor Physics (Comprising Design
and Technology Institute of Applied Microelectronics, United
Institute of Automation and Electrometry , and Design and
Technology Institute of Scientific Instrument-Making)
3 Mechanics And 1. United Institute of Hydrodynamics (comprises Lavrentiev
Engineering Institute of Hydrodynamics Design and Technology, Institute of
Sciences High-Rate Hydrodynamics, and Institute of Theoretical and
Applied Mechanics)
2. Kutateladze Institute of Thermal Physics
3. Institute of Mining.
4 Chemistry 1. Institute of Chemical Kinetics and Combustion,
2. Institute of Inorganic Chemistry,
3. Vorozhtsov Institute of Organic Chemistry,
4i Institute of Solid State Chemistry and Mechanochemistry,
5. United Institute of Catalysis
5 Life Sciences 1. Institute of Soil Science and Agrochemistry
2. Central Siberian Botanical Garden
3. Institute of Animal Systematics and Ecology
4. Institute of Cytology and Genetics
5. Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry
The institutes engaged in life sciences have greenhouses, vivaria
and experimental farms, including a unique collection of genetic
pool of native animals.
6 Earth Sciences 1. United Institute of Geology, Geophysics and Mineralogy.
Sukachev Institute of Forest
2. Novosibirsk Department of the Institute for Water and Ecological
Problems
Four associated institutes are engaged in studies of general
geology, petroleum and gas geology, geophysics, mineralogy and
petrography.
Sino Research Areas Research Institutes in Akademgorodok
7 Social Sciences 1. Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering,
2. United Institute of History, Philology and Philosophy with its
associated institutes of Archaeology and Ethnography, History,
Philology, Philosophy and Law.
The State Public Science and Technology Library of the SBRAS plays an important role
in information supply for research and educational institutions of Novosibirsk, as well as
of the whole Siberia and the Far East. The library is the largest to the east of the Urals
and stands with the largest libraries of the world in importance.
Source: Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, (1998) http:/hvww-
sbras.nsc.ru/sicc/welcome.htm
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APPENDIX 2
Map of Taedok Science Town
Zone for Education, Research,
and Related Facltlies
Residentiai Zone
and Commercial Zone
E Green Zone
Distribution of land uses in 1988 and 2000
Land Uses in TST Education and Residential & Green area Total
research Commercial and others
facilities (sq. m) areas
Percentage 1988 13,157,084 2,181,828 11,867,822 27,600,000
of total land (48%) (9%) (43%) (100%)
area
2000 12,696,000 1,932,000 12,972,000 27,600,000
_ 
_ _ 
(46%) (7%) (47%) (100%)
Source: DSTA
LIST OF RESEARCH INSTITUTES (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE) IN TST
1 Korea Research Institute of
Standard and Science
2 Korea Atomic Energy Research
Institute
3 Korea Institute of Geology Mining
& Materials
4 Electronics and
Telecommunications Research
Institute
5 Korea Research Institute of
Chemical Technology
6 Korea Ginseng and Tobacco
Research Institute
7 Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
8 Korea Science and Engineering
Foundation
9 Korea Institute of Energy
Research
10 Korea Institute of Machinery and
Metals
11 Systems Engineering Research
Institute
12 Korea Institute of Bioscience and
Biotechnology
13 Korea Aerospace Research
Institute
14 Nuclear Environment Technology
Institute
15 Korea Astronomy Observatory
16 Korea Basic Science Institute
17 Science Technology Yellow Page
18 Ssangyong Research Center
19 LG Chemical Research Park
20 Hankook Tire Research and
Development Center
21 Honam Petrochmical Corp.
Taedok Research Institute
22 Daelim Industrial Co. LTD Taedok
Research Institute
23 Shinsung Technology Research
Institute
24 Hanhwa Group Research and
Engineering Center
25 Pah Chun R&D Center
26 Samsung Technology Research
Institute
27 Samsung Advanced Institute of
Technology
28 Samsung Fine Chemicals Co.
LTD R&D Center
29 Kohap Taedok R&D Institute
30 Samyang Genex Research
Institute
31 Sunkyang Group Taeduk science
Town
32 Korea Register of Shipping
33 Kumho Chemical Laboratories
34 Taekwang Research Center
35 Dongbu Advanced Research
Institute
36 Korea Advanced Institute of
Science and Technology
37 Chungnam National University
38 Chungnam College
39 Korea Security Printing & Miniting
Corporation Technical Research
Institute
40 Korea Electric Power Research
Insitute
41 Water Resources Research
Institute
42 Korea Nuclear Fuel Co. LTD
43 Korea Telecom Outside Plant
Technology Laboratory
44 Korea Land Development
Corporation. Land Research
Institute
45 National Science Museum
46 Keum River Environmental
Management Office
47 International Intellectual Property
Officials Training Institute
48 Taejon Metropolitan City Officials
Training Institute
49 Taejon Regional Meteorological
Office
APPENDIX 3
SYSTEM OF 'TECHNOBELTS" ACROSS SOUTH KOREA
1. A West Coast Belt, from Seoul to Kwangju, specializing in energy and food production;
2. A South Coast Belt, from Kwangju to Pusam, centered on heave industry;
3. A North-South Bent, linking Suwon, Taedok and Pusan, organized around electronics,
semiconductors and textile industries; and
4. An East-West Bent, connecting Kwanghu, Taedok and Kandnung with new
developments in medical and social services research and production.
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APPENDIX 4: Location and Land Use Plans for Tsukuba Science City
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APPENDIX 5
Chronology of Events for Tsukuba Science City
Year Event
1963 The Cabinet approved the Tsukuba area as the site of a new science city.
1964 The National Region Development Commission completed a blueprint for the
Academic New Town. The Cabinet approved a plan to start the construction from
1965 and to complete it within about 10 years. The Cabinet decided to found the
Academic New Town Construction Promotion Headquarters.
1966 Land acquisition began.
1967 The Cabinet approved of the basic policies of the development of the New Town,
and identified 36 national institutes to be relocated.
1968 Construction work of research/educational facilities started with a large-scale
earthquake simulator at the National Research Center for Disaster Prevention of
the Science and Technology Agency.
1969 The Cabinet decided to complete transfer of 11 national institutes by 1972.
1970 The "Tsukuba Science City Construction Act" was enacted and implemented.
1971 The head office of promotion of Science City Construction finalized fundamental
principles of the development project and outline of the construction program of
public and service facilities.
1972 Government employees started to move into official residences. The National
Research Institute in Inorganic Material became the first institution transferred to
the city.
The Cabinet decided to increase the number of national institutes to be relocated
or newly established to 43.
1973 The University of Tsukuba was opened.
1975 The Cabinet decided to change the final date for the completion of the transfer of
all research/educational institutes from 1975 to the end-fiscal year 1979.
1977 The Tsukuba Academic New Town Council, comprising Ibaraki Prefecture, towns
and villages concemed, research and educational institutes in the area and Japan
Housing Corporation, was established.
1980 43 research and educational institutions were ready to begin operations.
The "Research and Education District Construction Plan" was approved.
1981 The "Surrounding Suburban District Development Plan" was approved.
1983 The Tsukuba Center Building was open.
1985 The International Exposition of Science and Technology (Tsukuba Expo'85) was
held, attracting more than 20 million people. Joban highway was directly
connected to Tokyo.
1987 The merger of existing towns and villages officially formed Tsukuba City.
1989 The New Tsukuba Plan was drawn up.
1996 The "Science and Technology Basic Plan" was decided.
1998 A change of the "Research and Education District Construction Plan" was
decided, and a change of the "Surrounding Suburban District Development Plan"
was approved.
Source: TSCI and Castells and Halls, 1994
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APPENDIX 7
Framework for Partnership Between Universities and Industry
Joint Research
This form of collaborative research started in 1983,
corporations, etc., and professors from national universities
on issues common to both parties.
where researchers from private
conduct research on an equal level
National university Private corporation, etc.
joinnt cfes sartS
Commissioned Research
Commissioned research refers to research conducted publicly under the commission of private
corporations by national university professors. The number of Commissioned Research has
gone up from 1286 cases to 4499 cases with a much faster rise after 1994.
National university corporation/individual
nonation Offer
Payment of the Donation
Grants and Endowments
Grants and Endowments refer to the financial donation made to national universities by private
corporations, etc., or individuals for the purpose of scientific research or enhancing educational
activities.
National university Private corporation, etc.
CommIssioned research apprecation
Payment of esearch costs
Report at resewch results
Making use of universities technologies
The Japan Science
Technology Agency)
the licenses.
and Technology Corporation (under the jurisdiction of the Science and
implements various programs to support licensing and the practical use of
University, etc.
S(National1 pblic private)
Researchers, etc.
Technology
Licensing
Organization
s Subm=ico !Patent o a licaori of rights
Patent Office
Corporation
Venture businesses, etc.
or~n
Preferential Tax Treatment
Preferential treatment is given in the tax system in order to promote
universities and industry.
partnership between
1) The joint experiment and research tax system
For corporations that had conducted joint research with national, public or private universities, a
fixed percentage of what they pay in trial research costs is exempted from corporate tax and/or
Income Tax.
2) Exemption from financial contribution
Corporations can include the total amount of grant contributions in their losses, and individuals
ca be exempted up to 25% of its income as contributions to the central government.
In addition, there is a program, which enables national universities to accept researchers and
engineers employed in private corporations to give guidance at the graduate level. This is
known as Commissioned Researchers.
Source: Press Release 2000/04, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
Appendix 8
Survey of Research and Development Activities in Singapore
The 2000 National Survey of R&D in Singapore was conducted from April to July 2001. A total
of 582 organizations reported that they performed R&D in 2000. This included 539 private
sector organizations, 6 higher education institutions, 24 government organizations and 13 public
research institutes and centers. 316 or 58.6% of the private sector companies were locally
owned, while the remaining 223 (41.4%) were wholly foreign or less than 30% locally owned.
Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD)
In 2000, Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) grew by 13.3%, from $2.66bil to $3.01bil. The
private sector accounted for 62% of the total national GERD.
Figure 1: Gross Expenditure on R&D and GERDIGDP (by Year)
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800 -i
600-
400 -
200 -
0- '..-.' --- ---- - - - -
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
- 2
-1-8
- 0-6
- 1.6
- 1.2
-1
- 0.8
- 0.6
- 0.4
- 0.2
-0
EM Public Sector (S$ml) EM Private Sector (S$mil) -+- GERD/GDP Ratio (%)
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore, 2000 (NSTB)
GERD by Strategic Focus
Figure 2: Strategic Focus of R&D Activities (2000)
1200
1000-
800-
600-
400-
200 -
Pure Basic Strategic Basic Applied Research Experimental
Research Research Development
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore, 2000 (NSTB)
GERD by countries
* Private Sector
(S$mil)
* Higher Education
Sector (S$mil)
o Govemment Sector(S$mil)
0 Public Research
Institutes and
Centers (S$mil)
Figure 3: International Comparisons - GERD/GDP (%)
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APPENDIX 9
Examples of Government-Linked Companies in Singapore
State Owned Companies Industr
1. BIL International Ltd International investment company
2. Australand Holdings Real Estate
3. ASA Group Holdings Manufacturing
4. Vertex Management Venture capital
5. Premas International Asset management in the real estate
industry
6. The Ascott Group Serviced residence company
7. SNP Corporation Media Group
8. SPH AsiaOne Ltd Media
9. S'pore Airport Terminal Services Airport services
10. SempCorp Industries Engineering Services
11. Singapore Computer Systems IT
12. SembCorp Logistics Ltd Logistics
13. Singapore Food Industry Ltd Food processing
14. Singapore Bus Services Transit Ltd Transportation
15. Singapore Exchange Financial Services
16. Singapore Airlines Ltd Airline
17. SIA Engineering Company Engineering Services
18. Sembawang Kimtrans Logistics
19. SembCorp Marine Ltd Ship building
20. SMRT Corporation Ltd Transportation
21. S'pore Petroleum Company Ltd Oil
22. Singapore Press Holdings Media
23. Singapore Technologies Assembly Test Electronics
Services Ltd
24. Singapore Telecoms Telecommunication
25. Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd Engineering
26. Raffles Holdings Ltd Real Estate
27. Parkway Laboratory Serv Healthcare
28. Parkway Holdings Ltd Healthcare
29. Neptune Orient Lines Ltd Shipping
30. Natsteel Broadway Ltd Diversified Business Group:
31. Natsteel Ltd Electronics, building products (cement
and precast concrete), chemicals,
engineering products and services, and
property development.
State Owned Companies Industry
32. Keppel Integrated Eng Ltd Diversified Business Group:
33. Keppel Hitachi Zosen Rig building, offshore conversion, ship
34. Keppel FELS Energy & Infra repair & shipbuilding, network & utility
35. Keppel T&T Ltd engineering services, development &
36. Keppel Corporation Ltd fund management services, other
37. Keppel Land Ltd business investments
38. Keppel FELS Ltd
39. Keppel Capital Holdings Ltd
40. Keppel Tatlee Finance Ltd
41. Jurong Engineering Specialists in plant engineering and
construction company
42. Jurong Technologies IT
43. Insurance Corp of S'pore Ltd Insurance
44. Horizon.Com Ltd E-business venture
45. Delgro Corporation Ltd Transportation
46. Delifrance Asia Ltd Food
47. DBS Financial
48. Chartered Semiconductor Electronics
49. Capitaland Ltd Real Estate
50. Comfort Group Ltd Transportation
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